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1. Introduction 
Undoubtedly, for the so called Western World, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001 (9/11), were among the most important events in the first decade of the 21st century1. In 
the style of many speeches held by politicians on 9/11 and thereafter, Thomas Birkland 
(2004) titled a research paper “The World Changed Today” (p. 179). In fact, the world 
changed in various aspects: The US and allies went to the “war on terror” against the Taliban 
in Afghanistan and against the Saddam-Regime in Iraq (e.g., Stone & Rizova, 2007). 
Furthermore, security measures and intelligence service activities were increased up to a level 
of total surveillance, which has just recently been discovered by the public (e.g., Gellman & 
Soltani, 2014). At least some of these measures were applied to regain security for the US 
and its citizens – an aspect massively under threat by the attacks. 
The terrorists of 9/11 proved awareness of psychological mechanisms and mass media 
functioning (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007; Shurkin, 2007). With this knowledge, they 
were highly successful in spreading terror. Besides the rather small group of directly affected 
individuals, they reached and – more importantly – affected millions of people who followed 
the events via TV in the US and around the world (Carey, 2003; Oswald, 2005; Reuband, 
2010). Opinion polls in the US and Europe found that the attacks and their broadcasting 
induced a state of perceived threat and insecurity (European Commission, 2002; Huddy, 
Khatib, & Capelos, 2002; Smith, Rasinski, & Toce, 2001; Traugott et al., 2002). Ahern, 
Galea, Resnick, and Vlahov (2004) emphasize how strong individuals have been indirectly 
affected. They showed that the probability of facing post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms 
increased with the duration of TV consumption in the week after 9/11 (see also Marshall et 
al., 2007). To sum up, for the Western World a new, pervasive threat was initiated on 
September 11, 2001. 
                                                 
1 This work is written from a Western perspective. Thus, whenever I write about ‘citizens’, ‘people’, and 
‘individuals’ in an unspecific manner, I refer to individuals from the so called Western World. 
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This threat was kept alive or reactivated by several more Islamist terrorist attacks, failed 
or foiled trials, terror warnings, and other terror related events (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & 
Shapiro, 2007). Even today, – more than ten years later – the perception of terrorist threat has 
not yet disappeared fully. Importantly, it can be re-triggered rapidly by a new event. 
Therefore, I aim to further our knowledge about the phenomenon of perceived terrorist threat 
and its social psychological and societal consequences. I will investigate the consequences of 
terrorism for Muslims living in Western countries as well as the changes of political 
ideologies2 in response to a terrorist attack. 
 
In the social scientific research field of intergroup relations, threat plays a pivotal role. 
Threat in various forms (e.g., realistic, symbolic, collective, individual) is known to increase 
prejudice against outgroups (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; for an overview and meta-analysis, 
see Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). The strongest effect can be expected against the group 
which is allegedly the source of threat/s (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). Thus, in case of 
Islamist terrorism, a derogation of Muslims is expected. I will evaluate this assumption in 
Manuscripts #1 and #2. Especially in Manuscript #1, I aim to answer the research question 
whether the post 9/11 anti-Muslim backlash can be explained by a social-psychological 
threat-prejudice-discrimination model (for an overview of research questions, see Table 1 at 
the end of this chapter). Additionally, I will evaluate whether this model holds true for other 
major and minor terrorist events in different countries over a time-span from 2001 to 2011. 
The research of Manuscript #2 is concerned with the antecedence of terrorist threat and 
prejudice. I will test competing theories about the temporal association of terrorist threat and 
anti-Muslim prejudice in Germany. Thus I will answer the question whether terrorist threat 
produces prejudice or whether the expression of existing prejudice is legitimated by terrorist 
                                                 
2 The working definition of the term “ideology” for this thesis is that individuals possess a core belief system 
(e.g., conservatism) that is shared with a group and gives meaning to political thinking and behavior (for an 
overview, see Jost, 2006). 
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threat. This is especially important due to the fact that the majority of immigrants in Germany 
have been Muslims long before 9/11. 
 
Besides its’ hypothesized enhancement of anti-Muslim prejudice, perceived terrorist 
threat is also supposed to have an influence on political ideologies. The following sums up 
the theorized mechanism: perceived terrorist threat increases the salience of one’s own death 
(called mortality salience; Landau et al., 2004). Mortality salience increases the desire of 
being part of a meaningful community sharing a worldview which outlasts one’s own death 
(Castano & Dechesne, 2005). Therefore, a major terrorist attack is assumed to lead to 
worldview defense, meaning that prior ideologies (e.g., political ideologies) are amplified 
(Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003)3. In Manuscript #3, I will test this hypothesis 
against an alternative which postulates that all individuals generally become more 
conservative after a terrorist attack (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). 
 
In the following I present a short overview of the historical context and provide an 
introduction to the psychology of terrorism. I continue with the two most relevant theories for 
this thesis and previous research where these theories were applied in context of terrorism. 
Then, I expand on the present research, by sketching the aims of the three manuscripts this 
thesis is built upon. 
 
1.1 Historical Background 
 Preceding last decade’s Islamist terrorism in the Western World, there has been a long-
lasting latent conflict mainly between the US and the people of the Islamic World. A possible 
explanation for this conflict is described by McCauley (2007): the Western world supports 
                                                 
3 For worldview defense in context of political ideologies, Huddy & Feldman (2011) introduced the term 
“ideological intensification”. 
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governments of Islamic countries which, however, suppress their own citizens. This, amongst 
other factors, may have induced Islamist terrorism by fundamentalist groups deriving from 
suppressed people. Yet, the history of this conflict and the multiple causes of last decades’ 
terrorism are much more complex (for an overview, see Halliday, 2002).  
On September 11, 2001 (9/11), Al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four airplanes. Two of 
them hit the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City, the third one the Pentagon in 
Arlington and the fourth one crashed on a field near Pittsburgh. All passengers died, together 
with hundreds of people in the WTC and the Pentagon. Altogether, about three thousand 
people lost their life and around six thousand were injured due to the immediate attacks on 
9/11 (Li, Kelley, & Kennedy, 2003; Woods, 2011). 
Since 9/11, Islamist terrorism or its countermovement, “the war on terror”, have been 
on the agenda in Western countries (for an overview, see Manuscript #1). To mention only a 
few events: in 2003 the so called “coalition of the willing” went to war against the regime in 
Iraq. A year later, Islamist terrorists killed 191 commuters in the morning of March 11, 2004 
in Madrid, Spain. On July 7, 2005, 52 people died in another horrific attack on public 
transport vehicles, in London, UK. The second half of the decade was characterized by failed 
or foiled attacks and the ongoing wars. For some people a decade of terrorism ended with the 
assassination of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 (Gollwitzer et al., 2014). In fact, the 
perception of terrorist threat has diminished – after a peak in response to bin Laden’s 
assassination – in the last years (Manuscript #1). However, it can be reactivated rapidly. 
 
1.2 Theoretical Background 
1.2.1 Terrorist Threat 
Fritsche, Jonas, and Kessler (2011) define threat as the individual’s expectation that 
something aversive is going to happen, especially if this coincides with a sense of losing 
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control. Stephan and Renfro (2002) locate threat on a cognitive level: “From our perspective, 
threat is a cognitive appraisal and fear is a common emotional response to this appraisal.” 
(p. 197) 
Last decades’ Islamist terrorism threatened many individuals to expect and fear further 
attacks. This threat about future attacks can be further differentiated. Scholars distinguish 
between collective and individual threat (e.g., Stephan & Renfro, 2002). In the context of 
terrorism, the wording collective and personal threat is common (Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, 
& Provost, 2002): Collective terrorist threat is often operationalized as perceiving danger for 
one’s own country or one’s superior ingroup. If individuals perceive (physical) danger for 
themselves, this is interpreted as personal threat. This differentiation is useful because 
collective and personal threat can have different consequences on psychological variables 
like authoritarianism (Asbrock & Fritsche, 2013). 
 
1.2.2 The Psychology of Terrorism  
Commonly, terrorists aim to induce political changes with their attacks4 (Abrahms, 
2006). Not the attacks themselves, but threat in large parts of the population as psychological 
consequence forces target governments to react (Friedland & Merari, 1985). To spread threat, 
terrorists often try to kill as many people as possible. This is to gain maximum attention and 
to create the impression that everyone could fall victim. Another aspect is the choice of target 
cities and buildings or traffic systems. In case of 9/11, national symbols were targeted (WTC, 
Pentagon) to humiliate the US and to emphasize their vulnerability. By doing so, terrorists 
proved a vast knowledge of psychological mechanisms (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007; 
Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2009). 
                                                 
4 In case of 9/11 however, there is no final clarity about the concrete political aims of the attackers (McCauley,  
2007) 
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Furthermore, choosing cities like New York, Madrid and London as targets ensured that 
camera teams would be on scene within minutes and broadcast their pictures around the 
world (Carey, 2003; Shurkin, 2007). This proved again terrorists’ ability to spread threat on a 
large scale because especially the live coverage of the happenings in New York City on 
September 11, 2001, was highly traumatizing and threatening to television viewers (Marshall 
et al., 2007). To sum up, last decades’ Islamist terrorists knew how to receive attention and 
how to convey terror and threat into every household in the US and beyond. 
 
The psychological consequences of terrorist threat are multifarious (for overviews, see 
Morgan, Wisneski, & Skitka, 2011; Woods, 2011). The crucial one for this work is the 
prejudice- and discrimination- increasing function of terrorist threat and its impact on 
political ideologies. Two theories seem especially appropriate to consider in these contexts: 
first, Integrated Threat Theory (ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), and second Terror5 
Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg et al., 1990). 
 
1.2.3 Integrated Threat Theory (ITT)  
ITT is an integration of threat accounts (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). It derives from the 
hypothesis, included in many classic studies of intergroup relations, that threat creates 
prejudice (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1979/1954; 
Blumer, 1958; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966). ITT considers realistic threat, 
symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotyping to explain the occurrence of 
prejudice (Stephan & Renfro, 2002). Importantly, the mere perception of threat is the crucial 
condition for prejudice to occur. 
                                                 
5 “Terror“ describes a state of threat and is not equivalent with terrorism. Thus, TMT is a more general theory 
that focuses not specifically on terrorism. German translation of “terror” = ”Schrecken, Entsetzen”. 
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Realistic threats, as formulated in Sherif’s (1966) realistic group conflict theory, are 
those resulting from competition for scarce resources between groups (see also Blumer, 
1958). Because this definition is relatively narrow, Stephan and Stephan (2000) enlarged the 
concept of realistic threat to any threat posed to the wellbeing of the whole group or its 
members (see also Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan, Renfro, & Davis, 2008). Terrorist 
attacks fulfill this concept. If the source of threat can be traced to a specific group it will 
cause hostility to that group (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; see also Allport, 1979/1954; Glick, 
2002, 2005). Thus, the occurrence of terrorist threat should lead to an increase in prejudice, 
especially against Muslims. 
Several studies combined perceived terrorist threat with ITT. Huddy et al. (2005) found 
in a large post 9/11 survey that individuals who felt threatened supported the invasion of 
Afghanistan and the discrimination of Muslims in terms of surveillance and special airport 
security checks and restrictions on visas, amongst other anti-terrorism policies. Doosje et al. 
(2009) analyzed a cross-sectional mixed European survey which covered the perception of 
terrorist threat, anti-Muslim prejudice and discriminatory intentions. The authors were able to 
show that all these variables are interrelated, supporting the ITT view. In the same way, 
Oswald (2005) demonstrated that perceived terrorist threat was associated with anti-Arab6 
prejudice and discriminatory intention. 
The fact that the terrorists have been Muslims seems having a general skepticism 
against that group and its members induced (Yum & Schenck-hamlin, 2005). Muslims 
suddenly posed a perceived threat although only a few individuals of that group were actual 
terrorists (Cesari, 2004; Welch, 2006). 
A limiting factor of earlier research is its selectivity for specific attacks (mainly 9/11) 
and single countries (mainly the US) which restricts external validity of the results. To 
                                                 
6 In the US, the term “Arabs” is used to describe individuals mainly from Middle Eastern descent. The majority 
of Arabs are of Muslim faith (Shaheen, 2003). 
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overcome this shortcoming, I include an overview paper about perceived terrorist threat, anti-
Muslim prejudice and discrimination in several countries, covering a full decade of terrorist 
attacks and terror related events (Manuscript #1). 
Another shortcoming of previous research is that most studies are cross-sectional which 
allows no conclusions about the direction of causality for the portrayed variables. Therefore, 
in Manuscript #2 I will test whether the theorized temporal sequence of ITT is superior over 
alternative causations. 
 
1.2.4 Terror Management Theory (TMT) 
The theory connecting terrorist threat with changes in political ideology is called TMT 
(Pyszczynski et al., 2003). The basic idea behind TMT is that humans are aware of their 
mortality but refuse to accept their transience (Becker, 1997/1973). Contemplating one’s 
death, which TMT researchers call mortality salience, induces a state of threat (Greenberg et 
al., 1990). Individuals oppose that threat by strengthening their worldview (e.g., political 
ideology)7 and their group affiliation. Belonging to a larger entity means being part of 
something lasting longer than oneself which creates a sense of immortality (Castano 
& Dechesne, 2005; Castano, Yzerbyt, & Paladino, 2004). Of course, this is a symbolic form 
of immortality but it can buffer the threat of mortality salience (Greenberg, Solomon, & 
Pyszczynski, 1997). 
Previous Research connecting TMT with terrorism showed impressively that triggering 
thoughts about 9/11 experimentally increased participants’ level of mortality salience 
(Landau et al., 2004). Thus, terrorist attacks can indeed pose an existential threat. As 
mentioned above, according to TMT, individuals react with worldview defense if their 
mortality is salient. Therefore, Pyszczynski and colleagues (2003) hypothesized that terrorist 
                                                 
7 Worldview defense can be captured on various dimensions (for an overview, see Solomon, Greenberg, and 
Pyszczynski, 2004). 
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attacks also lead to worldview defense. In a later study, Pyszczynski et al. (2006) found that 
college students in a mortality salience condition showed on mean level higher support for 
extreme military interventions by American forces although they would cause thousands of 
civilian victims. As expected, this was moderated by respondents’ political ideology, 
supporting the worldview defense hypothesis. Only conservatives increased in support for the 
military intervention. Thus, individuals’ political ideology may influence reactions to 
mortality salience. This, however, is the topic of controversial debate, on which Manuscript 
#3 will focus (see Burke, Kosloff, & Landau, 2013; Jost, 2006). 
Previous research on TMT in context of terrorism is mainly experimental laboratory 
research. Thus, it has high internal validity but is not able to capture the complexity of real 
world terrorism. To overcome this shortcoming, natural quasi-experiments with real world 
terrorism could further our knowledge about the consequences of terrorist attacks on 
individuals’ worldviews. Echebarria-Echabe and Fernàndez-Guede (2006) provide such a 
design on the Madrid Bombings in 2004. However, they use independent pre-post attack 
samples. Therefore, in Manuscript #3 I will provide an analysis of a pre-post Madrid 
Bombing panel dataset, to reveal intraindividual change in worldviews (political ideology) in 
response to a real world terrorist attack. 
 
1.3 The Present Research 
1.3.1 Manuscript #1 
Thörner, S., Schmidt, P., & Gosen, S. (2014, submitted). Terrorist Threat, Prejudice, and 
Anti-Muslim Backlash. A Cross-National Poll Review for a Decade of Terrorism. 
 
Point of departure for Manuscript #1 was the observation that a wave of violent 
backlash against Muslims occurred in the US after 9/11 (e.g., Ibish, 2003). The arising 
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research question is therefore whether this macro phenomenon can be explained by a social-
psychological threat-prejudice-discrimination model (for an overview of research questions 
and major theoretical constructs in this thesis, see Table 1). I will derive such a model from 
ITT and research connecting prejudice with discrimination (for an overview, see Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 1986; for meta-analyses, see Schütz & Six, 1996; Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 
2008). To investigate the generality of the model, I will apply this model to different 
countries and different major and minor terrorist attacks and terror related events. One further 
aspect under scrutiny is the strength and sustainability of spillover effects from terror related 
events in one country to others countries. 
To answer the research questions, I review polls and reports about perceived terrorist 
threat, anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination for the US, Spain, UK, and Germany for a 
period from 2000 to 20128 (for an overview of research designs, data and methods, see Table 
2 at the end of this chapter). Most of that data is only available as mean scores and not as 
individual level data. Furthermore, the datasets available on individual level do not comprise 
all variables under research here. Therefore, I create timelines of mean scores for perceived 
terrorist threat, anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination. With this data, no test of causality 
is possible. The model is supported if threat, prejudice and discrimination increase in 
response to a terror related event. Thus, I theorize a micro-level mechanism which can only 
be observed on macro-level with the available data. To connect both levels, I refer to 
Coleman’s (Coleman, 1986, 1987) micro-macro theory and model. 
Where individual data or at least distribution measures are available, I will test for mean 
differences within time series (e.g., time series of anti-Muslim prejudice9 in the US). For 
Germany, one available dataset allows for working with latent means. In this case, I apply 
                                                 
8 The events considered happened between 2001 and 2011. Therefore, I used the term “a decade of terrorism”. 
However, the data captures a somewhat longer period: 2000 to 2012. 
9 During my dissertation I discovered the controversy about the term “Islamophobia” (e.g., Imhoff and Recker, 
2012). Therefore, I switched to the term “anti-Muslim prejudice”. However, Manuscript #1 comprehends the 
word Islamophobia. 
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and measurement invariance testing (Meredith, 1993). 
Measurement invariance is a statistical procedure which checks whether the meaning of a 
factor remains the same over time which is a condition for latent mean testing. 
Depending on the results, I aim to derive marginal conditions for the functioning of the 
model between events and between countries. This has far-reaching practical implications, 
because it allows to develop intervention strategies which could be used to decrease the 
probability of anti-Muslim backlash after a terror related event. 
 
1.3.2 Manuscript #2 
Thörner, S. & Kauff, M. (2014, submitted). What comes first: threat or prejudice? Perceived 
terrorist threat and the derogation of Muslims in Germany. 
 
Whereas the data in Manuscript #1 allows for a macro-level perspective on the 
connection of perceived terrorist threat and derogation of Muslims, Manuscript #2 tests this 
connection on micro-level. In this manuscript, my focus is on the specific situation in 
Germany where Muslims have been the largest immigrant group for decades and prejudice 
against immigrants existed long before 9/11 occurred (e.g., Jonker, 2005). Thus, from a 
modern prejudice perspective (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; see also Crandall & 
Eshleman, 2003) it is conceivable, that terrorist threat is used as a legitimation strategy to 
express existing prejudice (Allen, 2004). The opponent hypothesis derived from ITT is that 
threat produces prejudice. The specific research question is therefore, whether perceived 
terrorist threat releases existing prejudice, produces new prejudice, or if both mechanisms 
occur simultaneously. 
To test these hypotheses against each other, I conducted a two wave online-panel with 
N = 88 respondents that participated in both panel waves. The panel consists mainly of 
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young, highly educated individuals. I test the hypotheses against each other by applying 
latent variable cross-lagged modeling (Jöreskog, 1979). Working with latent variables goes 
along with higher reliabilities of connections between variables due to consideration of 
measurement error on factor level (Kline, 2011). Furthermore, latent variable modeling 
allows for invariance testing of measurement models, which is a central assumption in 
working with panel data (Little, Preacher, Selig, & Card, 2007). Cross-lagged models are 
suited to reveal the antecedence of variables, questioning which variable predicts the other 
over time under consideration of autocorrelations within constructs (Finkel, 1995). 
An additional aim of this manuscript is to explore whether perceived collective and 
personal terrorist threat create differential effects on anti-Muslim prejudice and 
discrimination. This is because previous research revealed rather contrary results about 
differential effects (Asbrock & Fritsche, 2013; Huddy et al., 2002). 
Understanding the causal antecedence between perceived terrorist threat and derogation 
of Muslims is important because it allows the development of appropriate intervention 
strategies to diminish prejudice and discrimination. 
 
1.3.3 Manuscript #3 
Thörner, S. (2014, submitted). Conservative Shift or Ideological Intensification? The Impact 
of the 2004 Madrid Bombings on Germany. 
 
As mentioned above, in Manuscript #3 I consider the consequences of perceived 
terrorist threat from a somewhat different angle as in the first two manuscripts. The 
dependent variable under research is change in political ideology. Like in Manuscript #2 I 
test two competing hypotheses against each other. The first hypothesis is derived from Jost 
and colleagues’ research on conservatism as motivated social cognition (Jost et al., 2003). 
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The authors suggest that threat, including mortality salience, leads to a conservative shift in 
terms of political ideologies. This means that all individuals become more conservative when 
confronted with existential threat. TMT researchers, however, argue that mortality salience 
leads to worldview defense (ideological intensification), meaning that previous ideologies are 
strengthened (Pyszczynski et al., 2003). Thus, the research question of this manuscript is 
whether a terrorist attack leads to a conservative shift or to ideological intensification. 
To answer that research question, I reanalyze a representative German panel dataset 
which was conducted a year prior and a few weeks after the terrorist attacks on Madrid in 
March 2004. I apply a design suggested by Castano et al. (2011) to this data. Here, I consider 
the political self-positioning at t1 to explain the intraindividual change in a proxy measure of 
conservatism. I do this firstly in the same manner as Castano and colleagues and calculate 
residual change scores. Second, I apply an elaborated change score procedure from the family 
of longitudinal latent variable models (McArdle, 2009) called latent true change modeling 
(Steyer, Eid, & Schwenkmezger, 1997). 
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Table 1. Overview of research questions and major theoretical constructs. 
Manuscript Research Question Major Theoretical Constructs 
#1 Terrorist Threat, Prejudice, 
and Anti-Muslim Backlash. 
A Cross-Country Poll 
Review for a Decade of 
Terrorism. 
Can the 9/11 anti-
Muslim backlash in the 
US be explained by a 
threat-prejudice-
discrimination account? 
Time series of terrorist 
events, perceived terrorist 
threat, Islamophobia, 
discrimination 
How strong and 
sustainable are spillover 
effects on other 
countries? 
Does such a model hold 
true for the attacks on 
Spain and the UK? 
What are the marginal 
conditions of backlash? 
#2 What comes first: threat or 
prejudice? Perceived terrorist 
threat and the derogation of 
Muslims in Germany 
Does perceived terrorist 
threat lead to the 
derogation of Muslims, 
is terrorist threat used as 
a legitimation of 
expressing existing 
prejudice against 
Muslims or is a hybrid of 
this two models 
appropriate? 
Perceived collective terrorist 
threat, perceived personal 
terrorist threat, prejudice 
against Muslims, 
discriminatory intentions 
against Muslims 
Are there differential 
effects for personal and 
collective terrorist 
threat? 
#3 Conservative Shift or 
Ideological Intensification? 
The Impact of the Madrid 
Bombings in 2004 on 
Germany. 
Did the Madrid Bombing 
lead to a conservative 
shift or to ideological 
intensification in 
Germany? 
Time (pre & post terrorist 
attack), 
authoritarianism (proxy of 
conservatism), 
prejudice 
Is the change in 
conservatism after a 
terrorist attack dependent 
on the political self-
categorization at t1? 
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Table 2. Overview of research designs, data and methods of data analysis. 
Manuscript Research Design Data Method 
#1 Terrorist Threat, Prejudice 
and Anti-Muslim Backlash. 
A Cross-Country Poll 
Review for a Decade of 
Terrorism. 
Poll review, time 
series 
Multiple general 
population 
samples time 
series (cross-
national) 
ANOVA, 
confirmatory 
factor analysis, 
multiple group 
invariance 
testing, latent 
mean 
comparisons 
#2 What comes first: threat or 
prejudice? Perceived terrorist 
threat and the derogation of 
Muslims in Germany 
Two-wave panel Online panel Confirmatory 
factor analysis, 
longitudinal 
invariance 
testing, latent 
autoregressive 
cross-lagged 
structural 
equation 
modeling 
#3 Conservative Shift or 
Ideological Intensification? 
The Impact of the Madrid 
Bombings in 2004 on 
Germany. 
Natural 
experiment 
(Panel including 
a terrorist attack) 
General 
population panel 
Change scores, 
confirmatory 
factor analysis, 
longitudinal 
invariance 
testing, latent 
true change 
modeling 
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Abstract 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), many Muslims in the US 
became victims of a wave of backlash hate crime including arson attacks on mosques, violent 
discrimination and even murders. Based on social psychological threat theories, we derived a 
model hypothesizing that terrorist threat leads to prejudice and discrimination of Muslims. We 
applied this model to those three Western countries which faced major terrorist attacks in the 
last decade (US, Spain, UK) and one yet unaffected country (Germany). We reviewed various 
data sources, mainly opinion polls, covering the years 2000 to 2012, to assess the impact of 
major terrorist attacks and minor terrorist events on threat perceptions and scapegoating of 
Muslims. Results showed that the 9/11 attacks led to international spillover effects with 
increasing threat perceptions and derogation of Muslims in all focus countries. The attacks on 
the UK in 2005 induced a substantial increase in Islamophobia in all European countries 
considered. Nevertheless, the global pattern of results indicated that the predictions of the 
model were subject to marginal conditions on country level. We discuss those marginal 
conditions that inhibit or facilitate scapegoating of Muslims and gather promising strategies to 
avoid backlash in case of further terrorist attacks. 
 
Keywords: 9/11, Backlash, Poll Review, Terrorism, Threat, Islamophobia, Discrimination 
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“Some Muslims blew up the Twin Towers. […]  
You are kidding me. […] 
No, I’m not kidding you. You Muslims blew up the Twin Towers.”(Barkdull et al., 2011, 
p. 144) 
The consequences of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11), were 
devastating and wide-reaching for US citizens as well as the international community. Sharing 
the attackers’ religion, the effect on Muslims of the Western World was immense on an 
entirely different level, when the association of Islam and Terrorism was made (Allen & 
Nielsen, 2002; Barkdull et al., 2011; Doosje, Zebel, Scheermeijer, & Mathyi, 2007; Sheridan, 
2006). The outgroup ‘Muslims’ became an easy target as scapegoats for the attacks. An 
increase in hate crimes against Muslims in the US of about 1,600% was registered in 2001 
(FBI, 1998-2011). This backlash included arson attacks against mosques, violent assaults, and 
climaxed in several murders (Ibish, 2003; Kaplan, 2006). 
A number of consequences of last decades’ Islamist terrorism for Western societies are 
well researched (see Morgan, Wisneski, & Skitka 2011 and Woods 2011 for an overview in 
social sciences). The psychological fields of interest included posttraumatic stress (e.g., Galea 
et al., 2002; Laugharne, Janca, & Widiger, 2007; Marshall et al., 2007; Rubin et al., 2007), 
developments in political attitudes concerning support for war, increased security and anti-
terror measures and support for President Bush (e.g., Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Huddy, 
Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005; Landau et al., 2004), the role of the mass media (e.g., 
Birkland, 2004; Carey, 2003), and the media’s impact on perceived threat and prejudice (Das, 
Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009; Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2007). 
Although some substantial research (Oswald, 2005) and documentation about anti-Muslim 
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backlash (Ibish, 2003; Kaplan, 2006; Panagopoulos, 2006) is available, no overview about 
attitude and behavior changes towards Muslims in Western societies is accessible. We want to 
close this gap with this poll review. 
Terrorism is a form of communication aiming to create a climate of threat by 
randomly attacking civilians (Weimann, 2008). Terrorists make use of people’s vulnerability 
and mass media’s distribution of violence to spread threat (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007; 
Nacos et al., 2007; Shurkin, 2007). The role of threat is well researched and is expressed for 
example in Integrated Threat Theory (ITT; Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 
2000): it leads to ingroup favoritism and increased prejudice in general (Riek, Mania, & 
Gaertner, 2006). The threat occurring in mainstream society through Islamist terrorism and its 
broadcasting may thus create or deepen existing prejudices against Muslims (Das et al., 
2009). Furthermore, as theorized by Stephan & Renfro (2002) ‘prejudice’ is also predictor of 
the behavior ‘discrimination’ (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996; Schütz & Six, 
1996; Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 2008). The violent backlash against Muslims after 9/11 may 
thus be the product of the described threat-prejudice-discrimination process (Oswald, 2005). 
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Figure 1. Perceived threats in the EU before and after 9/11 
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Note. Data source: Eurobarometer (54, 56-59). Cross-sectional, EU (15) averaged, adult 
population data. Question Wording: Here is a list of things that some people say they are 
afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not? 
 
Figure 1 shows the development of EU-citizens’ fear of terrorism and war. The clear-
cut peak in October 2001 emphasizes that Europeans also felt a massive threat from the new 
phenomenon of international Islamist terrorism. Thus, the questions arises whether 9/11 
initiated the above theorized process in the US and likewise in European countries and 
whether this effect can also be found for other terror related events. Therefore, our main 
research question is whether we can find parallel fluctuations on aggregate mean level over 
time in perceived terrorist threat, anti-Muslim prejudice and (violent) discrimination across 
different countries and different major Islamist terrorist attacks and minor terrorist related 
events. We focused on the major terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) in the United 
States of America (US), March 11, 2004 (11-M) in Spain, July 7, 2005 (7/7) in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and several minor terror related events. In addition to the target countries US, 
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Spain and UK, Germany was chosen to evaluate the effects on a country that faced no major 
attack yet. 
This paper reexamines and reviews various public opinion polls, scientific polls, 
official- and NGO-reports, and several studies from the US and Europe. We provide a number 
of time series, covering the years 2000 to 2012. These time series enable us to analyze the 
strength of impact and its longevity, which often has to remain unconsidered in experimental 
and cross-sectional research. 
Major Islamist Terror-Attacks. Although the US has previously been victim of 
different forms of terrorism, the attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) were unique in their 
magnitude. Four airplanes were hijacked by Al-Qaeda terrorists. Two planes crashed into the 
World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City, one into the Pentagon in Arlington and 
another one crashed on a field near Pittsburgh. Approximately three thousand people were 
killed on that day (Li, Kelley, & Kennedy, 2003; Woods, 2011). A second major attack in the 
Western World targeted Madrid, the capital of Spain. Ten bomb blasts in four commuter 
trains left 191 people dead and 2051 injured on March 11, 2004 (11-M). A third major 
Islamist terror-attack hit London on July 7, 2005 (7/7). Four suicide bombers attacked three 
underground trains and a double-decker bus. In total, 52 civilians were killed and more than 
700 were injured.  
Theory Overview 
Scapegoating of Minorities. When the Black Death broke out in Europe in the 14th 
century, Jews were suspected of poisoning food and drinking water. The fact that Jews also 
died from the plague did not convince the majority to stop victimizing Jews as the scapegoats: 
Across Western Europe, Black Death pogroms against Jews took place (Cohn, 2007). This 
can be explained by a general need to envision a collective enemy. Often, this is a preformed 
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group that can be held responsible. Becker, Wagner, & Christ (2011) demonstrate this 
phenomenon as a consequence of the 2008 worldwide economic crisis. They show that threat, 
elicited by the crisis, is related to ethnic prejudice when respondents believe immigrants are 
the cause, and prejudice against Jews when respondents believe bankers and speculators to be 
the cause. Likewise Allport (1979/1954) explains the choice of a group as “the scapegoats” by 
contemporary circumstances (see also Glick, 2002, 2005). Consequently, current events and 
problems of the majority need to be considered. On September 11, 2001, pictures of 
Palestinians who allegedly celebrated the death of thousands of Americans were broadcasted 
all over the world (FoxNews.com, 2001). Fueled with the knowledge of the terrorists being 
Muslims, these pictures deepened the negative image of citizens with Islamic faith in general. 
Thus, Muslims became the scapegoats of the attacks (Cesari, 2004; Welch, 2006). 
Terrorist Attacks, their Broadcasting and Perceived Threat. The broadcasting of 
the 9/11 disaster was unique in its international broadcasting. Already seven minutes after the 
first tower was targeted, the media broadcasted live pictures in Germany (Reuband, 2010). 
Pictures of help-seeking people on the floors above the impact and falling bodies were made 
public. The whole world followed this horrifying situation via television. When the first tower 
collapsed, viewers realized that hundreds of people were dying that very minute. The news of 
the attack spread rapidly. For both, the US and Germany, data suggests that two hours after 
the first attack, 90% of respondents in flash polls had heard about the catastrophe (Carey, 
2003; Reuband, 2010). 
No media templates existed for such a happening as 9/11 (Hoskins, 2006). Media 
templates are attempts to classify the current incident in context of previous events. Neither 
the media nor the citizens had means of comparison for 9/11, rescaling their experience of 
evilness. Especially the post-attack insecurity was unparalleled. Major concerns were: “Are 
there more attacks to come? Was it only the beginning of a war against the US or even against 
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the whole Western World? Are we facing a World War? Do terrorists have weapons of mass 
destruction?” (see also Figure 1 for Europe). Consequently, the attacks and their broadcasting 
caused a climate of insecurity, fear and threat (Huddy, Feldman, Lahav, & Taber, 2003; 
Nacos et al., 2007). The impact of TV broadcasting in these days can be grasped by the fact 
that the exposure rate to television news in the week after 9/11 proofed to be a predictor of 
experiencing posttraumatic stress disorder (Ahern, Galea, Resnick, & Vlahov, 2004). 
However, not only posttraumatic stress can be the consequence of terrorist news reports, also 
increased prejudice against outgroups can occur (Das et al., 2009). 
Threat, Prejudice, and Discrimination. “One of the most pervasive and powerful 
effects of threat is to increase intolerance, prejudice, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia, 
regardless of whether threat is defined as a widely acknowledged external force or a 
subjective, perceived state.” (Huddy et al., 2005, p. 594)  
Several theories are built on the idea of intergroup threat creating hostility and bias 
between groups (see Riek et al. 2006 for a meta-analysis). Realistic group conflict theory 
(RCT; Sherif & Sherif, 1969) is one of the first theories to consider intergroup threat as a 
predictor for intergroup conflict (see also (Blumer, 1958). RCT focuses on the competition 
between groups concerning scarce resources. If a dominant ingroup feels that a subordinate 
outgroup increases its demands, the ingroup reacts with a devaluation of the outgroup in terms 
of negative attitudes. 
Stephan and Stephan (2000) incorporated several threats into their integrated threat 
theory (ITT). This theory considers realistic and symbolic threat and stereotypes to explain 
the emergence of prejudices (see also Stephan & Renfro, 2002). In ITT realistic threat is 
understood as any threat to the welfare of the group or its members (Stephan & Stephan, 
2000, p. 25). This broader definition also covers the threat imposed by terrorism. 
Furthermore, Islamist terrorism increases the salience of differences between Western and 
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Islamic cultures which produces symbolic threat. Additionally, Muslims suffer from the 
negative portrayal in mass media in Western countries, which leads to a socialization of 
negative stereotypes in the autochthonous majority (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010; Shaheen, 
2003). 
In addition to the well-established link between threat and prejudice, we refer to the 
link between the attitude ‘prejudice’ and the behavior ‘discrimination’ (see Schütz & Six, 
1996; Talaska et al., 2008, for meta-analyses; Dovidio et al., 1996). Pereira, Vala and Costa-
Lopes (2010) find threat to mediate the link between prejudice and discrimination. They 
conclude that threat is a legitimation and justification to discriminate others (see also Pereira, 
Vala, & Leyens, 2009). In the same way, Wagner and Christ (2007) show that prejudice is an 
important determinant of readiness of violence and that this effect is mediated and moderated 
by anger and fear. 
 
Figure 2. Theoretical macro-micro model. 
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Note. This model is not tested in this study. The focus lies on the outcome measures on the 
macro level (mean perceived threat, mean Islamophobia, and sum of discriminatory acts). 
 
In summary, as the backlash showed, the outgroup ‘Muslims’ became the scapegoats 
after 9/11 because of their similarity to the attackers. In Figure 2, we conceptualized a 
simplified heuristic model showing the assumed relations. On the macro level threat was 
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spread via nonpareil broadcasting of the attacks. What followed was a situation of general 
insecurity. Prevailing psychological theorizing on micro level suggests that threat, prejudice 
and discrimination are intertwined, with threat being the cause and prejudice and 
discrimination the consequences. These assumed changes on individual level should cause a 
measurable effect on aggregate mean (macro) level (see Coleman, 1986, 1987 for a micro-
macro theory and model).  
In the four studies of this paper, we listed the terrorist events of each country, analyzed 
the available, independent, aggregate level time series of terrorist threat, Islamophobia 
(prejudice) and discrimination, and checked whether the occurring patterns fit our heuristic 
model. However, a strict test of the model was not realizable with the available data. 
 
Study 1: United States 
The US faced several terrorist attacks before 9/11. For instance, in early 1993 a car 
bomb exploded in the underground garage of the WTC. Six people were killed that day. In 
April 1995, autochthonous terrorists destroyed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma and 
left 168 people dead. However, the attacks of 9/11 were unprecedented in their magnitude. 
Our time series start in the year 2000. The events considered as threat-trigger are in 
chronological order: 9/11 (September 2001), the intrusion into Iraq (March 2003), the Madrid 
Bombings 11-M (March 2004), the London attacks 7/7 (July 2005) and the assassination of 
Osama Bin-Laden (May 2011). Referring to our heuristic model, we assume these events and 
their broadcasting to increase terrorist threat, anti-Muslim prejudice and violent 
discrimination of Muslims, at least temporarily. 
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Table 1. Data Time Series US 
Dimension Data Source Time Span Used 
(Measurement Points) 
Kind of 
Data 
Applicable 
Analysis 
Threat: USA Today/ Gallup 
Personal Threat 
Apr. 2000 – Aug. 2011 
(40) 
quantitative descriptive 
 USA Today/ Gallup  
Collective Threat 
Sept. 2001 – Aug. 2011 
(29) 
quantitative descriptive 
Islamophobia: Princeton Survey 
Research Associates 
(PSRA) 
Aug. 2000 – June 2003 
(5) 
quantitative ANOVA 
 The PEW Forum on 
Religion and Public 
Life (PEW) 
Mar. 2004 – Mar. 2011 
(7) 
quantitative ANOVA 
Discriminatory  
Acts: 
Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) 
Annual sum 1998-2011 
(12) 
quantitative descriptive 
 
Data and Methods. Table 1 gives an overview about the data used to create the time 
series figures for the US. In some cases there is data available earlier conducted than the year 
2000, which is not considered here for reasons of space. This is the case for terrorist threat 
monitoring, where Gallup and USA Today started to investigate concerns for terrorism in the 
population after the terrorist attacks on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma in April 
1995 (USA Today/Gallup Poll, 2011): “Now, thinking for a moment about terrorism, how 
worried are you that you or someone in your family will become a victim of terrorism - very 
worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, or not worried at all?” This question covers 
personal terrorist threat. The data includes also the aspect of collective terrorist threat which is 
the degree of agreement to the question “how likely is it that there will be acts of terrorism in 
the United States over the next several weeks - very likely, somewhat likely, not too likely, or 
not at all likely?” Sample sizes are N≈1000 each. For both questions Gallup provides the 
distributions of these four categories. Thus, we were able to calculate means. The scale ranged 
from 1 to 4 and was recoded to transform high threat perceptions into high scores. 
We correlated collective and personal threat time series to see whether they show the 
same developmental pattern. Only aggregate scores for polls conducted on approximately the 
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same dates were considered for this analysis. This resulted in N=20 simultaneous 
measurement points that could be correlated over time. The time series correlate with r=.549, 
p<.01. We conclude personal and collective terrorist threat to be sufficiently equal on 
aggregate level over time. Thus, we refer in the results part to ‘threat’ only and do not 
differentiate between personal and collective threat (but see Asbrock & Fritsche, 2013; 
Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, & Provost, 2002, for studies differentiating personal and collective 
terrorist threat on individual level). 
Princeton Survey Research Associates (PSRA) provide data on the unfavorability of 
Muslim-Americans (see Panagopoulos, 2006). Their question wording is: “Is your overall 
opinion of Muslim Americans, very favorable, mostly favorable, unfavorable, or very 
unfavorable?” Five measurement points are available, starting in August 2000, thus providing 
a pre-9/11 measure. The last data point is in March 2003. The Ns range from 2799 to 1500 
(average N = 2069). Data is weighed to be representative for the national adult population. 
Since the distributions of the data are available we were able to compute means and 
confidence intervals and apply variance analyses with Bonferroni post-hoc tests. 
The PEW Global Attitudes Project asks for the favorability of religious groups in 
several countries including the US (PEW Global Attitudes Project, 2004-2011; PEW Global 
Attitudes Project, 2008). For the US-American, adult population, cross-sectional probability 
samples were drawn starting in 2004 with an approximate N of 1000. Data was either 
representative for the 18+ adult population or weighed to be representative. The question 
wording was: “Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat 
unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Muslims.” Raw data was provided on the PEW 
homepage (www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets) which enabled us to compute variance 
analyses with Bonferroni post-hoc tests. 
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Due to different question wording in the PSRA data (target group: Muslim Americans) 
and PEW data (target group: Muslims), the timelines are not comparable in terms of their 
absolute level. Hence, we test for mean differences within the PSRA times series and within 
PEW time series but do not compare the level of agreement between PSRA and PEW data.  
The “Hate Crime Statistics” of the FBI, which also records Anti-Islamic hate crimes 
(FBI, 1998-2011), provides a valuable database for discrimination occurrence. ‘Hate Crime’ 
is defined here as “criminal offense against a person or property motivated in whole or in part 
by an offender’s bias against a race, religion, disability, ethnic origin or sexual orientation.” 
(FBI, 2013) From this data we created a time series. A limiting factor is that only aggregate 
data per year is provided. Thus, no short-term fluctuations are observable. Further data is 
provided by NGOs: the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (Ibish, 2003; Ibish, 
2008) and the Human Rights Watch (2002). 
For all data throughout this paper, cross correlations between the independent time series of 
threat, prejudice and discrimination but also time series modeling (e.g., Box, Jenkins, & 
Reinsel, 2008) were inappropriate analysis methods because of different times of conduction 
and varying time lags. 
Results 
Threat. Figure 3 shows the time series of personal and collective threat as well as the 
unfavorability of Muslims and Muslim-Americans, respectively. The pre-post 9/11 
comparison revealed a massive shift towards a threatening climate. Also, the intrusion into 
Iraq led to an increase in threat. No polls were available for the immediate phase after 11-M 
and the four months after. The increase in threat in response to 7/7 was also consistent with 
our model. Since then the measurement points have been scarce with the last peak in the 
direct aftermath of the assassination of Bin-Laden. 
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Figure 3. Time series of terrorist threat and Islamophobia in the US 
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Note. Data source: Gallup time series of terrorist threat and PSRA & PEW unfavorability of Muslims. Cross-sectional, adult population data. 
Gaps in threat data of more than one year are not connected with lines. 
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Prejudice. We tested whether changes in prejudice were in line with the fluctuations 
in threat. Two PSRA pre-9/11 measures of unfavorability of Muslim Americans were 
available. Both were on a higher level than the first post-9/11 measure in November 2001. 
Thus, contrary to the development of threat, Islamophobia decreased in response to 9/11 
(March-01 vs. November-01; p<.001). In February 2002, however, the score increased to the 
pre-9/11 level again (November-01 vs. February-02; p<.001). No fluctuation can be seen in 
response to the intrusion into Iraq (February-02 vs. March-03; p>.05) although threat was 
increased. The PEW data starting point in 2004 shows the highest level of unfavorability in 
that time series. Since 11-M is not covered in terms of threat monitoring, we had no 
assumption about the development of Islamophobia in the post 11-M measure 2005. We 
found prejudice decreased (February-04 vs. April-05; p<.001) followed by a small but 
insignificant increase in the year after 7/7 (April-05 vs. April-06; p>.05). After that point, 
prejudice remained mainly stable until 2011. 
 
Figure 4. Number of registered anti-Islamic hate crimes in the US 1998-2011 
 
Note. Data source: FBI hate crime statistics (FBI, 1998-2011) 
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Discrimination. The third variable in our model supposedly affected by the attacks is 
discrimination. We plotted the number of Anti-Islamic hate crimes and their standard 
deviation to Figure 4 in order to visualize deviations. Anti-Islamic hate crimes were isolated 
cases prior to 9/11. In 2001 a massive increase in anti-Islamic hate crimes occurred compared 
to 2000. Although we could not find the supposed increase in prejudice, a clear-cut increase in 
violent discrimination took place. More than five hundred cases were registered for 2001 in 
the FBI database. Human Rights Watch stated: "Over the past twenty years backlash hate 
crimes against Arabs and Muslims in the United States have become predictable, triggered by 
conflict in the Middle East and acts of terrorism associated with Arabs or Muslims. The hate 
crimes that followed the September 11 attacks nonetheless were unique in their severity and 
extent." (Human Rights Watch, 2002, p. 3) The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee reported on more than 700 violent incidents targeting Arab Americans, Arabs, 
Muslims and those who were perceived to belong to these groups in the first nine weeks after 
9/11. More than a hundred attacks against mosques and even four murders were registered; 
seven more murders of Muslims are suspected to be directly related to the attacks (Ibish, 
2003). 
In 2002, the number of incidents decreased to a lower but still increased level, 
compared to the years prior. Interestingly, the score remained on that level without any 
substantial deviations. This is the reason why we do not discuss these minor deviations for the 
following terrorist events separately. We conclude that only 9/11 led to an increase in hate 
crimes. These results were emphasized by the fact that no report mentions a further violent 
backlash in the US in response to another terrorist event. 
Summary and Discussion. We theorized a model in which perceived terrorist threat, 
anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination should increase in response to terror related events. 
We found perceived terrorist threat reaching its peak after 9/11. However, anti-Muslim 
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prejudice did not follow the pattern of threat. Even an opposite effect as theorized was 
measured in response to 9/11. We believe the significant decrease in unfavorability to be a 
short- to mid-term consequence of President Bush’s speech on September 20, 2001 where he 
called for differentiation: "The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends. It is not our 
many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that 
supports them." (CNN, 2001). A PEW report reveals that after the speech, the strongest shift 
towards favorability was seen amongst conservative republicans (PEW Research Center, 
2001). Whereas in March only 35% conservatives republicans had a favorable image of 
Muslim-Americans, in November 64% (+29%) positioned themselves that way. That Bush’s 
speech led to a short- to mid-term effect was further supported by the fact that aggregated 
unfavorability returned to a significantly higher level in February 2002. In terms of violent 
discrimination, 9/11 led to a massive backlash against Muslims and people who looked 
similar (Kaplan, 2006). The pattern of increased threat, decreased prejudice and increased 
discrimination does not fit our model. We refer to this pattern in our general discussion.  
The Iraq invasion had no impact on prejudice, although threat perceptions increased. 
Discrimination was not elevated in that year. This can be explained by the fact that the US 
was not directly threatened at that point but was attacking another country. Thus, the situation 
was not as emotional as the victim role after 9/11. The terrorist attacks on Spain did not affect 
Americans as much, either. Prejudice, measured with a large gap, shows a significant decrease 
in 2005, almost a year after 11-M. The fact that the poll institutions did not survey terrorist 
threat after 11-M is already an indication for the modest public interest in the happenings in 
Spain. Accordingly, no increase in discrimination was registered. 
Since the link between the US and UK is stronger than between the US and Spain, the 
7/7 consequences were polled and revealed a local peak in threat. The pre-post 7/7 measure of 
prejudice showed indeed a modest increase, which however, reached no significance. 
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Furthermore, the FBI hate crime statistics showed a level of anti-Muslim crime below the 
average. Thus, again no violent backlash was observed.  
 
Study 2: Spain 
Spain was the first European country subjected to a massive Islamist terrorist attack. 
One has to consider, however, the existence of an active separatist terror organization in Spain 
(Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) = Basque Fatherland and Liberty). Consequently, terrorist 
threat cannot always be allocated to Islamist terror. 
In March 2003, the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, including Spain, marched into Iraq. In 
fall 2010, a terror warning for central Europe, mainly France, the UK and Germany was 
issued by officials (Der Spiegel, 2010; Tisdall, 2010). Since terror warnings have not been as 
common as in the US, we assume the warning to have triggered perceived terrorist threat. 
Further expected threat triggers were 9/11 (Sept. 2001), 11-M (Mar. 2004), 7/7 (July 2005) 
and the assassination of Bin-Laden (May 2011).   
 
Table 2. Data Time Series Spain 
Dimension Data Source Time Span Used 
(Measurement Points) 
Kind of 
Data 
Applicable 
Analysis 
Threat: Eurobarometer 
Threat Old 
Nov. 2000 – Apr. 2003 
(5) 
quantitative descriptive 
 Eurobarometer 
Threat New 
Apr. 2003 – Nov. 2012 
(20) 
quantitative descriptive 
Islamophobia: Echabarria-Echabe 
& Fernández-Guede 
2006 
Feb. 2004 – Mar. 2004 
(2) 
quantitative narrative 
 The PEW Forum on 
Religion and Public 
Life (PEW) 
May. 2005 – Mar. 2011 
(6) 
quantitative ANOVA 
Discriminatory  
Acts: 
European 
Monitoring Center 
on Racism and 
Xenophobia 
(EUMC) 
Sept. 2001 – Dec. 2001 
July 2005 – Sept. 2005 
qualitative narrative 
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Data. Since 1973, the European Commission has ordered public opinion reports. The 
so called Eurobarometer is conducted two times per year (European Commission, 1995-2012) 
and consists of approximately one thousand face-to-face interviews with a representative 15+ 
aged sample of each country of the EU. Among standard questions, there is also space for 
situation specific questions like current fears and problems. Two time series were created 
from Eurobarometer Interactive Search System data (European Commission, 2013): first, data 
about Europeans’ fear of terrorism, spread of weapons of mass destruction, a world war, a 
nuclear or conventional conflict in Europe (see Figure 1 for EU level results), reaching from 
2000 to 2003 (labeled ‘threat old’), thus covering 9/11; second, the well-known Gallup 
question “what is the most important problem facing the nation” with the possible answer 
‘terrorism’ (labeled ‘threat new’). The data concerning this question is available from 2003 
until 2012 and hence covers 11-M and 7/7. Both aspects serve as proxies for terrorist threat. 
The Eurobarometer no. 61 provides particularly important data because the time of data 
conduction includes 11-M. However, only 73 respondents were surveyed after the attack (vs. 
927 before). We nevertheless provide results for both groups (pre & post) because they do not 
differ systematically in terms of socio demographics which means that also the post-sample is 
representative (Perrin & Smolek, 2009). Generally, we had to transform Eurobarometer data 
linearly to fit it to our 1 to 4 scale. Threat ‘new’ and ‘old’ are not comparable in terms of 
mean level.  
As for the US (Study 1), Islamophobia is covered by PEW data that measures the 
unfavorability of Muslims (PEW Global Attitudes Project, 2004-2011; PEW Global Attitudes 
Project, 2008). They only deviate from the US data in terms of smaller sample sizes. Number 
of observations range from 750 to 1000 (average N = 831; for further information and 
question wording see the PEW data description in Study 1). Monitoring of unfavorability of 
Muslims started in Spain in 2005, the year after 11-M. Thus, no pre-post attack comparisons 
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can be made for Spain with PEW data. However, Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede 
(2006) provide a pre-post 11-M design with Islamophobia as a dependent variable. 
The European Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC; since 2007 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights; FRA) recognized the seriousness of the 
9/11 attacks in terms of consequences for Muslims in Europe. Therefore, it ordered reports 
from its Racism and Xenophobia Network (RAXEN), mainly built upon nongovernmental 
organizations (Allen & Nielsen, 2002; EUMC, 2001). A similar study is available for the 
impact of the 7/7 attacks on Muslim communities (EUMC, 2005). 
Due to different definitions of hate crimes in the EU member states and a resistance to 
collect data about religious identity is gathering official racist or hate crime data a difficult 
undertaking in the EU (see e.g., EUMC, 2006). Existing data is not specific for religion, 
except for anti-Semitic incidents (FRA - European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
2012) and some time series are not reliable due to changes in data collection. Only qualitative 
data is provided by several NGOs applying their own standards on discrimination and hate 
crimes (e.g., Human Rights Watch, 2005). As a consequence of the different definitions of 
hate crime and the unsystematic data collection in the EU countries, no national hate crime or 
discrimination time series could be generated. 
Manuscript #1 
 
41 
 
 
Results 
Figure 5. Time series of terrorist threat and Islamophobia in Spain 
 
Note. Data source: Eurobarometer threat measures and PEW unfavorability of Muslims 
measures. Cross-sectional, adult population data.  
 
Threat. Figure 5 shows the time series of old and new terrorist threat and of 
unfavorability of Muslims. Congruent with our hypothesis, an increase in threat was observed 
after 9/11. This increase does not seem to be a short-term effect since the score remained on a 
higher level until the last measurement point of ‘old threat’ in April 2003. The intrusion into 
Iraq led to no change in threat. In consequence of 11-M, threat peaked but was decreased 
again in October 2004. Since then, the scores have been on a lower level, unaffected by 7/7. 
Apart from an increase in May 2007, the threat level decreased until 2010. No effect in 
response to the EU terror-warning was measured while there was a small increase after the 
assassination of Bin-Laden. 
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Prejudice. No systematic Islamophobia monitoring can be found in Spain before 
2005, thus we could not test for the impact of 9/11 and the intrusion into Iraq. This was also 
the case for the attack on Spain, 11-M. However, Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede 
(2007) coincidentally tested a new Islamophobia scale shortly before the attacks. By 
replicating the sample after 11-M, they created a natural quasi-experiment and showed a 
significantly increased score for Islamophobia post 11-M (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-
Guede, 2006). Representative PEW measures did not start until 2005. We expected to find an 
increased level in the post 11-M year, followed by a declining trend, especially because this 
was the developmental pattern of threat. In contrast to this expectation, the value peaked in 
2006 (April-05 vs. April-06; p < .001). A declining trend started afterwards, discontinued by a 
negligible increase in 2011 after the EU terror warning (April-10 vs. March-11; p > .05). 
Discrimination. Due to the lack of systematic data, only qualitative results gathered 
from reports can be presented here. The EUMC Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU 
after 11 September 2001 (Allen & Nielsen, 2002) reveals an increase in prejudice and 
discrimination, mostly lacking concrete numbers. Allen and Nielsen (2002) reported attacks 
on mosques, Muslims and even one murder, whereas a direct link to 9/11 is unclear. Thus, the 
impact of 9/11, in terms of discrimination of Muslims in Spain, remains vague. Since threat 
and prejudice (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006) increased after 11-M, we 
expected to find an anti-Muslim backlash. In fact, a EUMC report (2006, pp. 71–72) reveals 
several violent acts on persons and property (but see Human Rights Watch, 2005). The 
magnitude of the backlash, however, was not comparable to that of 9/11 in the US. Several 
minor attacks took place, but serious crimes, mostly committed by Neo-Nazis, were also 
registered. Whereas threat decreased and prejudice increased after 7/7, no hints of anti-
Muslim backlash can be found. 
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Summary and Discussion. We applied our heuristic model to Spain, facing not only 
the first Islamist terror attack on European ground but also the danger of an autochthonous 
terror organization. In terms of terrorist threat, we find an increase after 9/11, as expected. In 
concordance with our model qualitative reports indicate increases in prejudice and 
discrimination against Muslims. In contrast to the immediate backlash in the US, the reported 
increases in prejudice and discrimination in Spain were registered with some delay. The first 
EUMC report (2001), covering the period from September 11 to late November 2001, shows 
no anti-Islamic reactions. The summary report of May 2002, however, states an increase in 
prejudice and discrimination (Allen & Nielsen, 2002). Even one murder is believed to be a 
backlash hate crime of 9/11.  
Threat peaked after 11-M. In terms of prejudice, we have to rely on the finding of 
Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede (2006) who report not only an increase in 
Islamophobia but also in anti-Semitism and general authoritarian tendencies. This suggests a 
general devaluation of outgroups in response to the attacks. However, their small and 
unrepresentative sample renders a limiting factor. 
Spain remained unaffected by 7/7 in terms of threat. However, a contrary development 
for prejudice was observed. The first measure after 7/7, in April 2006, reveals a significantly 
increased level of Islamophobia (April-05 vs. April-06; p < .001). An increase in hate crimes 
could not be found in this context. 
 
Study 3: United Kingdom 
 The UK, United States’ closest ally in the war against terror became the third target of 
a major Islamist terror attack in July 2005 (7/7). Furthermore, the UK faced another serious 
terror attempt in August 2006, when Islamist terrorists tried to smuggle explosives into ten 
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planes in London. The Police was able to avert this plan and arrest the terrorists (BBC News, 
2006). Nevertheless, we assume this foiled attack induced threat in the still traumatized 
country. Chronologically, we suppose 9/11 (Sept. 2001), the intrusion into Iraq (March 2003), 
11-M (March 2004), 7/7 (July 2005), the Airline terror plot (Aug. 2006), the EU terror 
warning (Oct. 2010) and the assassination of Bin-Laden (May 2011) to have triggered 
perceived threat and subsequently anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination in the UK. 
 
Table 3. Data Time Series UK 
Dimension Data Source Time Span Used 
(Measurement Points) 
Kind of 
Data 
Applicable 
Analysis 
Threat: Eurobarometer 
Threat Old 
Nov. 2000 – Apr. 2003 
(5) 
quantitative descriptive 
 Eurobarometer 
Threat New 
Apr. 2003 – Nov. 2012 
(20) 
quantitative descriptive 
Islamophobia: The PEW Forum on 
Religion and Public 
Life (PEW) 
Mar. 2004 – Mar. 2011 
(7) 
quantitative ANOVA 
Discriminatory  
Acts: 
European 
Monitoring Center 
on Racism and 
Xenophobia 
(EUMC) 
Sept. 2001 – Dec. 2001 
July 2005 – Sept. 2005 
qualitative narrative 
 London 
Metropolitan Police 
(MET) 
Jun. 2005 – Sept. 2005 
(13) 
quantitative descriptive 
 
 Data. For the UK, mainly the same database was used as for Spain. Threat old and 
new was extracted from Eurobarometer data. The main difference to Spanish threat data from 
Eurobarometer is, that no pre-post comparison of 11-M is possible with the UK data because 
the post sample differs in terms of sociodemographics from the pre-sample, meaning that the 
post-sample is not representative. 
Anti-Muslim prejudice data was derived from PEW data (see chapter Data in Study 2 
for question wording and further information). The number of cases in PEW surveys ranged 
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from 500 to 1000 (average N = 773; see Chapter Data in Study 1 for question wording and 
further information). Since no national anti-Muslim hate crime statistic is available, we make 
our case here with (faith) hate crime data provided by London Metropolitan Police (EUMC, 
2005). Their definition of hate crime and faith crime is as follows: “Hate crime incidents are 
crime reports that have been flagged as faith, race, anti-Semitic, anti-Islamic and 
homophobic crimes. Faith crimes are a count of crime reports flagged specifically as faith 
hate.” (EUMC, 2005, p. 13) This data shows results only for the larger London area. We used 
data from end of June 2005 up to end of September 2005 to show the immediate dynamics 
after 7/7. Since the faith hate crime data is not specific for religion no time series for 
Islamophobic faith crimes can be extracted.  
 Results 
Figure 6. Time series of terrorist threat and Islamophobia in the UK 
 
Note. Data source: Eurobarometer threat measures and PEW unfavorability of Muslims 
measures. Cross-sectional, adult population data. 
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Threat. We found 9/11 leading to a peak in perceived threat. The intrusion into Iraq, 
however, resulted in no increase. Threat new did not cover the immediate 11-M dynamics. 
However, the first measure after the attack in October 2004 reveals a slightly increased score.  
The attack on the UK led to another peak measured in October 2005, followed by a phase of 
relaxation. The above mentioned airline terror plot increased threat perceptions again. Since 
then, threat has been decreasing, which was only interrupted by the EU terror warning and the 
assassination of Bin-Laden. Thus, we find almost all our expectations concerning threat 
confirmed. 
Prejudice. No systematic Islamophobia monitoring for the UK was found concerning 
a period before 2004. Thus, a description of the immediate 9/11 dynamics was not available. 
For 11-M, pre and post data was available, which showed a small decrease (February-04 vs. 
April-05; p>.05) instead of the expected increase in the post measure. The next pre-post 
consideration, with 7/7 as trigger showed a significant increase (April-05 vs. April-06; p<.05). 
Since then only minor fluctuations below the threshold of significance occurred. The level, 
however, remained constantly increased compared to 2005. 
Discrimination. For the UK, there is no hate crime statistic for the whole time span 
that includes data for specific religious target groups. Referring to the post 9/11 EUMC report 
(EUMC, 2001), the British media reported an increased number of attacks against Muslims in 
the aftermath of 9/11 without presenting concrete numbers. The incidents comprehended 
violence against persons and property including firebomb and arson attacks against mosques, 
violent assault, spat on and verbal abuse, mainly targeting on easily identifiable Muslims – 
women who wore the hijab. 
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Figure 7. Number of hate crimes and faith hate crimes in the London area before and after 7/7 
 
Note. Data source: EUMC report (2005) on the impact of 7/7 on Muslim communities in the 
EU. Period June-September 2005. 
 
Anti-Muslim discrimination in consequence of 11-M has not been documented for the 
UK. However, there was a sharp increase of hate crimes in London following 7/7, similar to 
the 9/11 backlash (EUMC, 2005). Figure 7 shows the increase in (faith) hate crimes. Fifteen 
faith hate crimes were registered in the week prior to 7/7, 68 in the week of the happenings 
followed by 92 in the week after. The same development can be seen for general hate crimes 
where a peak of more than five hundred incidents was registered in the week after the attacks. 
It took about six weeks until the number of incidents fell back to a pre-7/7 level. The time 
series of faith hate crimes and hate crimes in Figure 7 correlate with r=.877, p<.001. Not only 
for the London area but also for other parts of the country, NGOs reported an increased 
hostility against Muslims and those appearing as such (e.g., Sikh people; Allen, 2004; EUMC, 
2005).  
Summary and Discussion. We applied our heuristic model to the closest ally of the 
US in the war against terror, the UK. The 9/11 attacks also led to an expected peak in threat in 
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the UK. No statement based on quantitative Islamophobia and discrimination monitoring 
could be made concerning 9/11 but sufficient evidence for a backlash was gathered by the 
EUMC (Allen & Nielsen, 2002). Muslims, especially women wearing the hijab, became 
victim to assault and verbal abuse. Arson attacks against mosques were registered as well.  
No appropriate data was available to describe the situation of threat in the UK after 11-
M. No consequences in prejudice were measured after 11-M. Data concerning discriminatory 
acts are not available and there were no hints for a violent backlash at all. The attack on the 
UK itself, however, initiated a full confirmation of our model. Not only threat but also 
prejudice and discriminatory acts increased substantially in the post-7/7 measures. 
Interestingly, faith hate crimes and general hate crimes correlate almost perfectly (r=.877, 
p<.001) in the time series covered in Figure 7. Thus, not only hate crimes against Muslims but 
also against other outgroups increased dramatically in this period. 
The airline terror plot, as well as the EU terror warning and the assassination of Bin-
Laden led to an increased threat level but no consequences in prejudice and discrimination 
were registered. The threat, prejudice, discrimination connection seems to be subject to 
marginal conditions in these complex real world scenarios. We enlarge on these conditions, 
which facilitate the occurrence of a violent backlash, in our general discussion. 
 
Study 4: Germany 
 Germany is the only researched country in this paper that has not yet been target of a 
major terrorist attack. However, also Germany faced two incidences that showed its 
vulnerability to terrorism. On July 31 in 2006, two men of Middle Eastern origin attempted an 
attack on trains in Cologne, one of Germany’s largest cities. They deposited suitcases 
containing bombs, which failed to detonate. The second incident happened in September 
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2007, when a whole terror-cell was arrested while planning attacks and building bombs 
(Kulish, 2009). In addition, for Germany we assume the major events 9/11 (September 2001), 
11-M (March 2004), 7/7 (July 2005), the EU terror warning (October 2010) and the 
assassination of Bin-Laden (May 2011) to have triggered threat. 
 
Table 4. Data Time Series Germany 
Dimension Data Source Time Span Used 
(Measurement Points) 
Kind of 
Data 
Applicable 
Analysis 
Threat: Eurobarometer 
Threat Old 
Nov. 2000 – Apr. 2003 
(5) 
quantitative descriptive 
 Eurobarometer 
Threat New 
Apr. 2003 – Nov. 2012 
(20) 
quantitative descriptive 
 Politbarometer  
Most Important 
Problem - Terrorism 
Jan. 2001 – Dec. 2010 
(120; monthly 
averages) 
quantitative descriptive 
 Politbarometer Sept. 2001 – Nov. 2010 
(18) 
quantitative descriptive 
 Allensbach Dec. 2001 – Sept. 2009 
(12) 
quantitative descriptive 
 R+V Insurance July 2001 – July 2012 
(13) 
quantitative descriptive 
Islamophobia: Group Focused 
Enmity (GFE) 
Apr. 2003 – June 2011 quantitative latent 
means 
 The PEW Forum on 
Religion and Public 
Life (PEW) 
Mar. 2004 – Mar. 2011 
(7) 
quantitative ANOVA 
Discriminatory  
Acts: 
European 
Monitoring Center 
on Racism and 
Xenophobia(EUMC) 
Sept. 2001 – Dec. 2001 
July 2005 – Sept. 2005 
qualitative narrative 
 
Data and Methods. As table 4 shows, a larger database was available for Germany 
compared to the former countries. Beyond more aggregate level data, also individual data was 
accessible. Like for Spain and the UK, threat was extracted from Eurobarometer data (see 
chapter Data in Study 2 for question wording and further information) but also from 
additional data sources described below. As it was the case for the UK, no pre-post data 
conducted shortly before 11-M was available in the Eurobarometer. 
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Anti-Muslim prejudice was measured, like in the other focus countries, by PEW data 
(see chapter Data in Study 1 for question wording and further information). The number of 
cases in PEW surveys ranged from 500 to 1001 (average N=772). Furthermore another data 
source for Islamophobia was available, which is described below. No national anti-Muslim 
hate crime statistic exists. Therefore, we had to rely on qualitative NGO reports again (Allen 
& Nielsen, 2002; EUMC, 2005).  
The additional time series of threat was created from data by the institute for public 
opinion research Allensbach (Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 2001a; 2001b; 2004; 2006; 
Köcher, 2009), the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen/ZDF Politbarometer (Forschungsgruppe 
Wahlen, 2000-2010; data provided by GESIS Central Archive Cologne) and the "Fears of 
Germans Survey" by the R+V Insurance (Roemstedt, 2011, 2012). With the exception of the 
R+V insurance survey, the data was produced for newspapers and television news, and is in 
most cases available as aggregated percent values only. 
The R+V insurance has a time series of annual repeated cross-sections, which was 
conducted face-to-face with representative samples of 14+ aged Germans with N≈2500 
respondents. Respondents rated several items on a 7-point Likert scale. The item wording 
was: “Please tell me how threatening the following scenarios are for you personally.” The 
terror item is: “...that terrorist unions commit attacks.” The scores 5, 6 and 7 are interpreted as 
"high threat". The surveys were always conducted from mid-June to mid-July and not in 
response to events. The only exception was an additional survey in 2005, conducted because 
of 7/7. In Figure 8, for reasons of feasibility we placed the scores of the annual survey to June 
2005 (instead of July) and the post 7/7 poll to July 2005. 
ZDF Politbarometer also provides representative samples of the adult German 
population which are conducted via computer assisted telephone interviews (CATI). The 
samples consist mostly of N≈1000 respondents or more seldom of N≈500 respondents. Item 
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wording examples are “Do you worry about similar terrorist attacks to occur in Germany as 
seen in the US?“ or „During the previous week, terror attacks occurred in Madrid. Do you 
worry that there will be terrorist attacks in Germany in the near future?“. 
Allensbach data consists of representative samples (N ≥ 2000) of the 16+ adult 
population. Question wording was “Are you afraid of terrorist attacks to occur in Germany in 
the near future?”. 
The additional Islamophobia time series was created out of adult population data from 
the project “Group Focused Enmity in Germany” (GFE; Zick et al., 2008). The measure for 
anti-Muslim sentiments is based on two items of the annual cross-sections from 2003 to 2011. 
Each cross-section builds upon approximately 2000 respondents (average N = 1953). The first 
item is “with so many Muslims in Germany, one feels increasingly like a stranger in one’s 
own country”, the second one reads “immigration to Germany should be forbidden for 
Muslims.” To ensure the invariance of this measure over time, multiple group confirmatory 
factor analyses were conducted (see e.g., Brown, 2006, pp. 266–304) via the Software Mplus 
6 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). The robust maximum-likelihood-estimation was used to correct 
for any deviations from normality in the data. Missing values are considered via Full-
Information-Likelihood-Estimation (FIML; Arbuckle, 1996). Partial scalar invariance was 
reached, resulting in a good model fit (χ²=8.554, df=8, p=.381, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.006, 
SRMR=.014). Thus, the factor structure, factor loadings and intercepts are sufficiently equal 
in order to compare latent means over time (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989). One 
specialty when comparing latent means over time is that the mean of t1 is set to zero as a 
reference point. To transform the data back to the original scale (1 to 4), we added the 
manifest level of Islamophobia t1 to all measurement points. This transformation is 
practicable since comparisons are only made within the time series and not between them. 
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Figure 8. Time series of terrorist threat in 
Germany
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Note. Cross-sectional, adult population data. Gaps of more than one year are not connected. 
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Results 
Threat. Figure 8 shows an increase in all available threat measures in response to 
9/11. Almost 40% of Politbarometer respondents believed terrorism to be the most important 
issue facing the country in October 2001 and more than 65% expected terrorist attacks to 
occur in Germany, too. Except for the annual R+V survey which showed an increasing trend 
until 2003, the threat level measured by other institutes subsided in the months after the 
attacks. The Madrid Bombings, 11-M, led to a clear-cut increase in threat perceptions in 
Allensbach data. The Politbarometer most important issue-question reveals a local peak. No 
increase at all was seen in the Politbarometer terrorist threat measure. Again, somewhat 
differing results are found for 7/7. Whereas R+V and Allensbach data revealed an increase, 
only negligible change happened in Euro- and Politbarometer data. The first terror bomb plot 
to Germany itself, in Cologne, led to an increase in all threat measures. Once again, Euro- and 
Politbarometer indicated an increase when the Sauerland terror cell was arrested while 
planning attacks and building bombs. Since then, Politbarometer and Allensbach did not 
gather data about terrorist threat on a regular basis. Eurobarometer data showed a sharp 
increase in threat in response to the EU terror warning and a slightly delayed decrease in the 
relaxation phase due to Bin-Laden’s assassination. Thus, although not every measure detected 
every event, all events induced increased measurable threat perceptions in one or more of the 
available time series. 
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Figure 9. Time series of Islamophobia in Germany 
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Note. Data source: PEW unfavorability of Muslims measures and GFE Islamophobia 
measures. Cross-sectional, adult population data. 
 
Prejudice. Given that Islamophobia monitoring started in Germany in 2003 (GFE) 
and 2004 (PEW), respectively, no data covers 9/11. There was only one poll in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11 that asked for the direct connection of terrorism to Muslims, which showed 
that 19% of the respondents reported to be more skeptical against Muslims since the attacks 
(Der Spiegel, 2001).  
Pre-Post 11-M comparisons revealed no significant increase in prejudice (GFE: April-
03 vs. April-04; p>.05; PEW: February-04 vs. April-05; p>.05). A significant increase, 
however, was documented in PEW data post-7/7 (April-05 vs. April-06; p<.05). The same 
trend was seen in GFE data but without reaching significance (June-05 vs. May-06; p>.05). 
Since then, in both time series a slightly decreasing trend was observed until 2009. In 2010 
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the values increased again but independently from the events considered. The last possible 
pre-post comparisons included the EU terror warning (GFE, PEW) and the assassination of 
Bin-Laden (GFE). In PEW data almost no movement was observed in that time span (April-
10 vs. March-11; p>.05). Again, no increase but even a decrease of prejudice was measured in 
GFE data (June-10 vs. June-11; p<.001). 
Discrimination. Low levels of physical assault were reported for Germany after 9/11 
(EUMC, 2001). Nevertheless, verbal insults and even attacks like spitting on Muslims and 
tearing down the hijab occurred but no statistics were available for these mistreatments. Allen 
and Nielsen (2002) identified Muslim women and children to be the most prevalent targets. 
After 11-M and 7/7 no incidents of backlash in Germany were registered (EUMC, 2005). 
The only crime in Germany associating discrimination with terrorism was a murder in 
Dresden in 2009, where Marwa El Sherbini was stabbed to death in a courtroom (Martinez, 
2009). Out of hatred against Muslims, a man killed this Muslim woman and called her “a 
terrorist”. In 2011, a case of three right-wing terrorists gained attention; they had murdered 
ten people since 2000, nine of which had immigrant background (Pidd, 2011). The murders 
never occurred in direct response to Islamist terror attacks and their motive was considered to 
be xenophobia and not revenge for Islamist terror. 
Summary and Discussion. We applied our heuristic model to Germany, which faced 
no attack yet but was shown to be vulnerable to terrorism as well. We find only partial 
confirmation for our model. A clear-cut peak in threat was measured in response to 9/11 but 
the supposed increase in Islamophobia cannot be confirmed since no data was available. Only 
hints but no statistics were available for an increase in discriminatory acts against Muslims. 
These cases comprehended no major assaults. 11-M led in most of our measures to an 
increase in threat but not in prejudice and discrimination. Not only increased threat but also a 
significant increase in prejudice was measured in response to 7/7. Significance, however, was 
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reached only in one of our two Islamophobia data sets (PEW). Nevertheless, the other data set 
(GFE) showed the same pattern. Indications for a backlash after 7/7 were not registered. The 
cologne bomb plot and the arrest of the Sauerland terror cell left people threatened but did not 
induce a backlash in terms of anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination. The same was true 
for the EU terror warning and Bin-Laden’s death. The fact that Germany was only indirectly 
affected by major terrorist attacks and that attempted terror attacks on Germany were 
unsuccessful or foiled, probably inhibited an escalation in prejudice and discrimination. 
 
Summary Table 
Table 5 documents the results of our poll review. In classified order, the reactions in 
threat, Islamophobia and discrimination are presented for each country. Threat is the most 
volatile of the three. Islamophobia and discrimination measures were influenced by major 
terrorist attacks only, not by minor events. 
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Table 5. Summary of Results 
 Event: 9/11 Intrusion 
in Iraq 
11-M 7/7 Cologne 
Bomb 
Plot 
London 
Airline 
Terror 
Plot 
Sauer-
land 
Terror 
Cell 
Arrested 
EU 
Terror 
Warning 
Assass-
ination 
of Bin-
Laden 
 Year: 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2006 2007 2010 2011 
US Threat + + / +     + 
 Islamophobia - 0 0 0     / 
 Discriminatory Acts + 0 0 0     0 
           
Spain Threat + 0 + -    0 + 
 Islamophobia / / nat-exp + +    0 / 
 Discriminatory Acts qual. (+) / qual. (+) /    / / 
            
UK Threat + 0 + +  +  + + 
 Islamophobia / / 0 +  0  0 / 
 Discriminatory Acts qual. + / / +  /  / / 
            
Germany Threat +  + + +  + + 0 
 Islamophobia /  0 + 0  0 0 - 
 Discriminatory Acts qual. (+)  0 0 /  / / / 
           
Note. + = increase, (+) = minor increase, - = decrease, 0 = unaffected, / = not measured, nat-exp. = pre-post natural experiment, qual. = 
qualitative report, empty cell = not relevant for that country. 
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General Discussion 
In this paper we tried to explain the massive violent backlash against Muslims in the 
US after 9/11 from a social psychological perspective. We created a model based on media 
research (Nacos et al., 2007) and integrated threat theory (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan 
& Stephan, 2000). The full heuristic model (Figure 2) implies that, on the micro level, 
Islamophobia and discriminatory acts against Muslims were the consequence of perceived 
terrorist threat. Threat itself, on the micro level, is the product of a threatening climate 
induced by major terrorist attacks and their media broadcasting on the macro level. Since 9/11 
led to a shift towards perceived terrorist threat in Europe as well, we applied the model to a 
cross-country poll-review focusing on the US, Spain, the UK and Germany. For all countries 
we considered the major terrorist attacks 9/11, 11-M and 7/7. In addition, we looked at 
country specific terror related events. One general finding is that prejudice and discrimination 
increase in response to threat only if an event reaches the magnitude of a major terrorist 
attack. Therefore, we discuss our model only for the major terrorist events 9/11, 11-M and 
7/7. 
Our expectation that the unprecedented increase in discriminatory acts in the US after 
9/11 was a product of increased prejudice mean level cannot be confirmed with our data. 
However, the measurement of prejudice in the aftermath of 9/11 was obviously influenced by 
President Bush’s call for differentiation. Other researchers find in their pre-post 9/11 studies 
hints of a shift towards authoritarian tendencies in the aftermath phase (Nagoshi, Terrell, & 
Nagoshi, 2007; Nail & McGregor, 2009). Unfortunately, none of these pre-post 9/11 studies 
included Islamophobia as a dependent variable. Nevertheless, the authoritarian tendencies 
they found commonly appear together with increased devaluation of outgroups (e.g., 
Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001). Further indications for increased prejudice are found in 
Panagopoulos’ (2006) poll review. He shows indications for increased subtle prejudice 
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against Muslims in general and Arabs in particular. This subtle prejudice manifested itself in 
substantial agreement to questions containing the demand to treat Muslims differently and to 
put them under special surveillance. 
As expected, we find massive spillover effects of 9/11 in terms of threat on Spain, the 
UK and Germany. The reason for the worldwide impact of 9/11 is that no media templates 
existed for such a happening (Hoskins, 2006). Media templates are attempts to classify the 
current incident in context of previous events. Neither the media nor the citizens had means of 
comparison for 9/11, rescaling their experience of evilness. Thus, 9/11 created a benchmark 
of terrorist threat. Unfortunately, no systematic measurement of Islamophobia is available for 
that time in our European focus countries. Nevertheless, some studies give at least hints for an 
increase in prejudicial tendencies. For instance, Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede 
(2007) developed their new Islamophobia scale in response to increased prejudice against 
Muslims after 9/11. However, they do not provide evidence for the claim that Islamophobia 
was increased in general since 9/11. In the UK, the same increase in Islamophobia is claimed 
but again no systematic measurement is available (Allen, 2004; Poynting & Mason, 2007). 
For Germany, some pre-post 9/11 data sets were analyzed by Brosig & Brähler (2002) that 
find social distance against Muslims but also against Jews to be increased. An analysis of the 
German Socio-Economic Panel 2001 reveals an increase in negativity towards immigration 
and a decrease in concerns over xenophobic hostility in German society (Schüller, 2012). 
According to Smith and colleagues (2001), the primary reaction to the 9/11 attacks 
was anger in 73% of the respondents in New York and 65% of the respondents across the 
United States (see also Back, Kufner, & Egloff, 2010). Since most of the hate crimes against 
Muslims, especially the severe ones, were committed in the very days after 9/11, it seems 
plausible that the backlash was a product of immediate arousal. Furthermore, Ibish (2003) 
reports that bigots may have seen their chance to abuse the state of emergency in order to 
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scapegoat Muslims. This hints at a legitimating role of threat in the prejudice discrimination 
relation as suggested by Pereira et al. (2010) and Wagner & Christ 2007; see also Dasgupta, 
DeSteno, Williams, & Hunsinger, 2009). Thus, it is not clear whether terrorist threat produced 
prejudice which in turn led to discrimination or whether prejudiced individuals used threat as 
legitimation to express their sentiments and aggression. 
Morgan and colleagues (2011) conclude that punishing supposed ethnic ingroup 
members of the attackers is a form of displaced aggression (for a review, see Marcus-
Newhall, Pedersen, Carlson, & Miller, 2000) where the need to punish proxies is especially 
high when the original attacker (Osama Bin-Laden) went unpunished (see also Goldberg, 
Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999). Interestingly, violent anti-Muslim backlash after 9/11 was reported 
across all focus countries. These hate crimes reached an alarming level in terms of severity, 
especially in the UK. 
Our model proves to be true for 11-M in Spain. Threat increased when prejudice and 
discrimination increased as well, although the violent backlash was minor. For 7/7 in the UK, 
we find our full model supported. Since the backlashes vary enormously in their extent, the 
question occurs which marginal conditions on country level facilitate or impede such a 
rebound effect? First of all, the probability of a backlash is, of course, higher in the country 
where the attack occurred. Second, the main media stereotype of ‘a Muslim’ is relevant. 
Whereas in the US and the UK the stereotype of a Muslim is characterized by fanaticism and 
terrorism, the stereotype of Muslims in Spain and Germany is mainly that of a labor 
immigrant (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010; Poole & Richardson, 2006; Shaheen, 1997, 2003). 
Connected to this, the third aspect is the similarity of a country’s Muslim population to the 
main media stereotype. We believe that if Muslims are visible as such and stereotyped as 
‘terrorists’, the probability of scapegoating increases. Sheridan and Gillett (2005) find in a UK 
post 9/11 foreigner sample that 68% of Muslims who became hate crime victims describe 
Manuscript #1 
 
61 
 
themselves as visible members of their religious groups. Their self-descriptive degree of 
visibility was significantly higher than that of Jews and Hindus. Visibility is often connected 
to specific symbols. In a shooter bias paradigm, Unkelbach and colleagues could show a 
higher frequency of gunfires against a man wearing a turban compared to the same man 
without a turban (Unkelbach, Forgas, & Denson, 2008). In line with this finding is that 
Muslim women who wore the hijab were the most common victim to hate crimes in Europe 
after 9/11 (Allen & Nielsen, 2002). In the US and the UK, Sikh men became repeatedly hate 
crime victims since their traditional costume is somewhat similar to Arab men’s traditional 
dress (Kaplan, 2006). The fourth important aspect is the elite reaction to attacks. An 
immediate call for differentiation by leading politicians and clerics can inhibit or at least limit 
the strength of backlash. In the US, this call for differentiation was announced ten days after 
the attacks. Since most of the severe attacks against Muslims and Mosques happened in the 
very days after 9/11, we assume an earlier intervention by President Bush could have relaxed 
the situation (see also Kaplan, 2006). However, even though the elite reaction in the UK was 
exemplary and harsh punishment for backlash crimes was announced (EUMC, 2005), 
violence against Muslims after 7/7 could not be prevented. This can be explained by the 
massive Islamophobic tension in the UK that lately surfaced again, after two Muslims 
committed manslaughter to a British soldier in London (Obeidallah, 2013). 
When we write about the numbers of hate crimes one has to consider that hate crimes 
in police reports are only the tip of the iceberg. A representative poll among Muslims in the 
greater London area revealed that only 11% of racist attacks in the aftermath of 7/7 have been 
reported to the police (see EUMC, 2005, p. 15). Thus, the actual number of backlash hate 
crimes is likely to be much higher. 
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Limitations and Future Research. Some limitations of our poll review need to be 
considered. Since this is a poll review, we deal with independent time series. Hence, we 
monitor our dependent variables in different data sets and on aggregate level. Thus, causality 
cannot be proven but only theorized. Not all data presented come from continuous monitoring 
projects. This lack in systematic and continuous data emphasizes the importance of prejudice 
monitoring. Based on such data researchers can figure out which minorities are endangered 
and politics can intervene. Several time series were conducted as response to 9/11. Hence, pre 
9/11 data on our variables are rare. Consequently, especially in the case of Islamophobia, we 
cannot be sure that 9/11 led to an uncovered increase in Spain, the UK and Germany. The 
possibility that the little movement in Islamophobia in our data is due to a constantly 
increased level since 9/11 cannot be excluded. However, the fact that the level of 
Islamophobia in the US, where pre- and post-data are available, is not constantly increased 
speaks against this argument.  
Another issue is our use of the aggregate mean level, especially because there is an 
ongoing debate (e.g., Burke, Kosloff, & Landau, 2013; Huddy & Feldman, 2011) about the 
effects of terrorist threat on political ideologies (ideological intensification vs. conservative 
shift) which is also connected to the devaluation of foreigners. Whereas Jost and colleagues 
(2007; 2003) suggest a collective conservative shift in response to terrorist threat, 
Pyszczynski, Solomon and Greenberg (2003) argue that an intensification in preexisting 
individual ideologies (also left-wing) occurs which would lead to an attenuation or 
nullification of effects on aggregate level. However, Greenberg and Jonas (2003) argue that in 
most capitalist nations the left-wing ideology is not as prominent as the right-wing ideology. 
Thus, even if a polarization happens in response to threat, the right-wing shift would be 
observed on aggregate level due to a higher quantity of right-wingers in society. To add to the 
aforementioned debate and to avoid that aggregate level limitation, future research needs to 
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consider intraindividual change to get insights into the process of terrorist-threat imposed 
attitude change. 
Furthermore, not all considered time-series fulfill scientific conditions of data 
gathering. Especially media related poll-institutions tend to adapt question wording to current 
events which challenges the equivalence of questions over time that is needed to build reliable 
time series. Furthermore, media related poll-institutions ask more often about issues whenever 
they are on the current agenda. This leads to differing time lags. The general problem of 
different time lags and non-simultaneous data points inhibited the use of advanced time series 
modeling. 
Another aspect future research needs to clarify is the question of causality between 
terrorist threat and outgroup derogation. In this paper we focused on the ITT perspective that 
threat produces prejudices (e.g., Stephan & Stephan, 2000). However, also an alternative 
model is conceivable: prejudiced individuals take the chance to express their prejudices, 
because terrorist threat legitimizes such an expression. This latter explanation is in accordance 
with modern racism theories (e.g., aversive racism; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) 
 
Conclusion and Implications. Even though our poll review reveals derogation and 
violence, we want to stress that by understanding the psychological processes and the 
temporal trajectory of backlash we create knowledge that can help to prevent threat to be 
transformed into prejudice and discrimination. Although, solving the primary conflict leading 
to Islamist terror attacks would be preferable, we can offer suggestions for a kind of 
symptomatic treatment (prevent backlash) when the conflict becomes salient again in shape of 
a new attack. 
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The easiest and most immediate step to stop the cycle of threat, prejudice, and 
discrimination is a call for differentiation by political elites. If people understand that attacks 
are a cruelty of some fanatics and that they do not have backing in the Muslim community, 
backlash can be lessened. However, right-wing radicals will always use the immediate state of 
emergency in the aftermath of attacks to discriminate minorities. Therefore, another step is to 
avoid the upcoming of such a state of emergency where people believe laws were repealed. 
Furthermore, practices in contemporary media should be challenged (Poole, 2002; 
Poole & Richardson, 2006; Richardson, 2009/2004; Shaheen, 2003). Especially since the need 
for a story led to the worldwide broadcasting of celebrating Muslims in response to 9/11 
(FoxNews.com, 2001) which however, was proven to be old video material enriched with an 
artificial scene created by journalists who paid those Muslims for celebrating (Erdmann, 
2001; Snow & Taylor, 2006). A more balanced and differentiating reporting about terrorism 
and Islam as, for instance, delivered by the newspaper El Pais in Spain (see Allen & Nielsen, 
2002), could reduce scapegoating.  
Finally, everyone should invest in good minority-majority relations since this would 
be an important first step to prevent individuals from radicalization which is probably the best 
way to diminish the problem of terrorism. 
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Abstract 
Prejudice against Muslim immigrants in the Western world has existed long before 
9/11. However, since then Muslims face more blatant devaluation, discrimination, and 
violence in the US and several European countries. This is also true for Germany, where the 
largest population of foreigners is of Muslim faith. According to modern racism theories 
(e.g., aversive racism) the autochthonous population could utilize perceived terrorist threat as 
a legitimation to express already existing prejudices. On the other hand, contemporary threat 
theories (e.g., Integrated Threat Theory; ITT) argue that threat produces prejudice. Thus, the 
question is what comes first – threat or prejudice? We apply this question to perceived 
terrorist threat and the devaluation of Muslims in Germany. Indications for causal 
antecedence are derived from a panel with two time points (N=88), analyzed with latent 
variable cross-lagged models. Results indicate that terrorist threat produces prejudice and 
discriminatory intentions against Muslims, thus supporting the ITT view. We discuss 
theoretical and practical implications of our results. 
 
Keywords: Germany, terrorism, threat, aversive racism, anti-Muslim prejudice, 
Islamophobia, cross-lagged model
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Introduction 
More than ten years ago three planes crashed into the World Trade Center in New 
York City and the Pentagon in Arlington. Not only the United States (US), but also large 
parts of the so called Western world were shocked and affected by this historic incident (e.g., 
Stone and Rizova 2007). Following 9/11, individuals’ subjective perception of terrorist 
threat1 was frequently triggered by both minor incidents, such as attempted terrorist plots in 
Germany2, and two major attacks on Spain and the United Kingdom (UK). Especially 
shocking for Germany was the fact that Mohammed Atta, the head of the 9/11 terror cell, and 
other attackers lived and studied in Hamburg, Germany, until 2000 (Jonker 2005). In 
consequence, a fair amount of Germans raised their general scepticism against Muslims (Der 
Spiegel 2001)3. Although a small circle of radical fundamentalists led the attacks, the blame 
was partially assigned to Muslims in general (Doosje et al. 2007). 
In the aftermath of the major terrorist attacks of the last decade, Muslims and citizens 
appearing as such experienced devaluation, discrimination, and violence especially in the 
target countries but also beyond (Allen and Nielsen 2002; Kaplan 2006). Although a higher 
occurrence of terrorist threat seems to be related to an increased devaluation of Muslims, it is 
unclear how threat and devaluation are related over time. Two alternative models and a 
hybrid of both are considered as explanations: first, contemporary threat theories (e.g., 
Stephan and Stephan 2000) argue that prejudice develops in consequence of perceived threat. 
Ingroup bias and outgroup derogation occur as defence mechanisms when individuals feel 
personally or collectively threatened (Stephan, Renfro, and Davis 2008). Second, other 
theorists (e.g., Gaertner and Dovidio 1986) suggest that threat could be used as a legitimation 
                                                 
1 The perception of ‘terrorist threat’ is primarily an intraindividual state of perceiving oneself or one’s country in 
danger. This concept is not equivalent to an objective state of terror alarm. 
2 On July 31, 2006, two Islamist terrorists placed bombs in trains in Cologne, Germany. However, the bombs 
failed to detonate. Furthermore, an Islamist terror cell was arrested in September 2007 while planning attacks. 
3 19 per cent affirmed the question “Do you feel more skeptical about Muslims since the attacks in the US”. 
NFO-Infratest poll (N≈1000) commissioned by Der Spiegel. 
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to express existing prejudice. According to this line of theory, individuals feel a strong social 
norm to hide their prejudices and thus search for situations in which expressing their bias 
feels adequate. This seems true if outgroups can be observed while misbehaving (e.g., 
committing terrorist attacks). This kind of theorizing is worth of consideration for Germany, 
because most immigrants to Germany are of Muslim faith (e.g., Cesari 2011), prejudice 
against immigrants existed already before 9/11 (e.g., Pettigrew 1998), and there is a strong 
general social norm to not express prejudice openly, particularly due to Germany’s Nazi 
history (e.g., Heyder, Iser, and Schmidt 2005). The third possible explanation is a hybrid 
form of the former two mechanisms, which is a bidirectional causal relation between threat 
and prejudice. 
 
Previous studies analyzing the relation of perceived terrorist threat, anti-Muslim 
prejudice, and discriminatory intentions (Doosje et al. 2009; Oswald 2005) adopted the 
predominant view that threat creates prejudice. However, most of these studies are cross-
sectional and thus cannot ensure whether their theoretical account is appropriate. Therefore, 
we investigated which theoretical perspective applies to the case of perceived terrorist threat 
and the derogation of Muslims in Germany. Instead of implementing a cross-sectional design, 
we used longitudinal data, which have the advantage of indicating the causal antecedence of 
the constructs under research (Finkel 1995). We used latent variable analysis, which 
considers measurement error leading to more reliable relations between variables (Kline 
2011). By applying cross-lagged models, we simultaneously test whether the devaluation of 
Muslims goes back to perceived terrorist threat, whether terrorist threat is the consequence 
(legitimation) of prejudice, or whether a hybrid model is most appropriate4. 
 
                                                 
4 For a conceptually similar study but in the context of general group threat, see Schlueter, Schmidt, and Wagner 
(2008). 
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Theoretical background 
Terrorist threat. Threat can be defined as the expectation of something aversive to 
happen (Fritsche, Jonas, and Kessler 2011; see also Stephan and Renfro 2002). Fritsche et al. 
(2011) describe terrorist threat as a ‘double threat’ because it can be perceived on group level 
(collective threat) and on individual level (personal threat; see also Huddy et al. 2002): 
terrorists attack national symbols to humiliate their target nations and they kill civilians to 
emphasize that everyone could become victim. 
The primary weapon of terrorists to reach their political goals is to spread threat (e.g., 
Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2009). Regarding this, Breckenridge and Zimbardo (2007) 
stated: ‘Terrorists appear to have a keen, intuitive appreciation of psychological mechanisms 
that spread the effects of terror well beyond their primary victims and amplify the perception 
of risk and vulnerability far out of proportion to reasonable probabilities.’ (p. 116) 
Islam and terrorism. Nowadays, in Western countries ‘terrorism’ is by default 
interpreted as ‘Islamist terrorism’ (Allen 2004). This emphasizes the close association that is 
made between terrorism and Islam in general. An indicator of this subjective close connection 
was the spontaneous biased accuse of Islamists as perpetrators when in July 2011 an 
autochthonous Norwegian terrorist committed a bomb plot in Oslo (Sehgal 2011; see also 
Rytter and Holm Pedersen 2013). 
A high portion of individuals in Europe imputes a sympathy with terrorists to 
Muslims (for an overview, see Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann 2011). For Germany, Leibold 
and Kühnel (2006) revealed in a representative survey from 20055 that over 60 per cent of 
respondents ‘agreed’ or ‘rather agreed’ with the statements: ‘Islamist terrorists enjoy backing 
of Muslims’ and ‘Islamist terrorists are adored as heroes by many Muslims’. Thus, the 
majority of Germans believes that Muslims endorse Islamic terrorism. The resulting question 
                                                 
5 The period of data gathering was Mai until June 2005. Thus, the data conduction was finished before the 
London Bombing (7/7) occurred. 
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is whether Muslims are perceived as a real threat to Germany and its citizens or whether this 
new facet of the stereotype of Muslims (terrorism) is used as legitimation to express already 
existing prejudice. 
Previous research. Several cross-sectional studies found terrorist threat and 
derogation of Muslims to be connected. For instance, Oswald (2005) tried to capture various 
correlates of anti-Arab reactions after 9/11. She discovered that perceived terrorist threat was 
significantly connected to prejudicial and discriminatory reactions towards Arabs. Doosje and 
colleagues (2009) analyzed a mixed European survey that included items about perceived 
terrorist threat, perceived Muslims’ support for terrorism, anti-Muslim prejudice and approval 
to discrimination of Muslims. The authors showed that perceived terrorist threat was 
connected to anti-Muslim prejudice and approval of discrimination. 
In the context of the Madrid Bombings in 2004, Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-
Guede (2006) delivered unique insights. They conducted a survey to test their scale of anti-
Arab prejudice coincidentally shortly before the attacks happened. Afterwards, they decided 
to repeat the survey with a similar sample. Prejudice against Arabs was significantly higher in 
the post sample compared to the pre sample. However, the mechanism underlying this 
increase in prejudice remains unclear. 
To our knowledge, the only panel analysis in the context of terror and outgroup 
derogation was conducted by Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen (2004). They analyzed a panel 
dataset which was conducted in September 2001 (t1) and January 2002 (t2). T1 comprised 
measures of anger and fear and t2 captured, among others, perceived threat, outgroup 
derogation, and political tolerance. The authors showed that fear and threat were significantly 
associated with outgroup derogation and political intolerance. However, because this study 
did not measure the constructs under research at both times, the possibility to derive causal 
antecedence is limited (Finkel 1995). 
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Experimental research revealed that increased salience of terror led to increased 
prejudice (Das et al. 2009). However, a simple threat manipulation6 does not reveal whether 
individuals increase in prejudice or whether the expression of existing prejudice increases. 
In summary, several studies assume threat to produce prejudice without validating this 
assumption. To our knowledge, there is no study that provides appropriate data for testing the 
causal direction of terrorist threat and the derogation of Muslims’. 
Competing models. Previous research and the observable anti-Muslim backlash 
following major terrorist attacks allow for the conclusion that terrorist threat is associated 
with prejudice and discrimination. However, the temporal sequence of perceived terrorist 
threat and outgroup derogation is unclear. Three models are available explaining this 
phenomenon: first, threat produces prejudice, second, prejudice is legitimated by threat, or 
third, both mechanisms occur simultaneously. 
Threat model. Terrorism can induce collective and personal threat (e.g., Huddy et al. 
2002; Fritsche, Jonas, and Kessler 2011). Both aspects are related to prejudice against 
‘others’. On an intergroup level, there is a long history of threat theories showing that threat 
is connected to prejudice (Blumer 1958; Sherif and Sherif 1969; Quillian 1995). More 
recently, Stephan and Stephan (2000) formulated an Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) which 
includes not only several forms of threat on an intergroup level but also on an individual level 
(see also Stephan and Renfro 2002; Stephan, Renfro, and Davis 2008). According to ITT, 
exclusionary attitudes, discriminatory intentions and behaviour are the consequence of the 
perceived presence of an outgroup that is connected to negative consequences for oneself or 
ones ingroup (Stephan and Renfro 2002).Threat in general is supposed to induce ingroup bias 
and outgroup derogation, while threat stemming from one specific group increases hostility 
especially towards that group (LeVine and Campbell 1972). If Muslims are perceived as 
                                                 
6 In this specific case a mortality salience manipulation. 
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being connected to terrorism, they will pose a threat to Germans’ and their country, which 
should in turn produce prejudice against Muslims. 
Legitimation model7. Allen (2004) argued that the upcoming of Islamist terrorism 
legitimized the expression of long-cherished prejudice against Muslims: ‘[...] 9/11 has made 
Islamophobia more acceptable, which has enabled its expressions, inferences, and 
manifestations to locate a newer and possibly more prevalent societal resonance and 
acceptability.’ (p. 2) This argumentation is in line with newer prejudice theories (Gaertner 
and Dovidio 1986; McConahay 1986). They argue that prejudice exists in individuals but is 
hidden by social norms and personal egalitarian beliefs unless there is a justification (e.g., 
terrorist attack) to express it8 (see also Crandall and Eshleman 2003). 
Hybrid model. Since both models are plausible, a combination of both mechanisms is 
also conceivable (Wilson 2001). Thus, derogation of Muslims would on the one hand be 
produced by perceived terrorist threat whereas on the other hand perceived terrorist threat 
would be used as a legitimation of earlier derogation of Muslims. Such an effect could be the 
result of either intraindividual bidirectional causality between terrorist threat and prejudice or 
contrary effects in subpopulations of the sample. 
 
The German context 
History of immigration. In the 1960s Germany arranged the so called 
‘Gastarbeiterprogramm’, a cooperation with Turkey, Italy, Morocco, and Yugoslavia 
enabling migration of guest workers from these countries to Germany (Herbert 2001). 
Because the workers were assumed to leave when their work force was no longer needed, no 
integration measures were initiated (Cesari 2011). However, those who worked in Germany 
                                                 
7 See Schlueter et al. (2008) for a somewhat different conceptualization of such a model. 
8 This process may be conscious or unconscious. Either, individuals consciously increase their scores of 
perceived terrorist threat to legitimate prejudice or they increase in threat perception unconsciously. A full 
discussion of conscious and unconscious processes, however, would be beyond the scope of this paper. 
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for more than five years were offered the opportunity to stay infinitely (Castles 1986). Many 
guest workers - especially from Turkey - took this chance and initiated reunions with their 
families in Germany. In consequence, already in the 1970s, 1.5 million Turkish immigrants 
lived in Germany.  
This development was considered undesirable among many autochthonous Germans 
(Jonker 2005), which became more imminent in the 70s during the oil crisis and in the 90s 
because of a huge debate about asylum seekers (Kurthen, Bergmann, and Erb 1997; Lubbers 
and Scheepers 2001). In 1990, over 30 per cent of autochthonous Germans in the general 
social survey agreed with the statement that guest workers should be sent back to their native 
countries if jobs get scarce (Bergmann 1997, 30). Thus, rejection and prejudice against guest 
workers existed long before 9/11. 
Today’s demographics and media image of Muslims. Today, around four million 
people (about five per cent of Germany’s population) are of Islamic faith. Turks are the 
largest immigrant group (about 70 per cent). The remaining 30 per cent root from South 
Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa (Archick et al. 2011). Due to the lack of 
integration measures in the first guest worker generation, Muslims still face a higher risk of 
being unemployed, poor, and low-educated (Archick et al. 2011). 
The picture of Islam in the German media is mostly negative and associated with 
immigration issues, radicalization, fundamentalism, and terrorism (Hafez and Richter 2007). 
Media reports about Turks in particular cover negative aspects of immigration like high 
unemployment, crime rates, and the lack of acculturation (Halm 2013). In the past twenty 
years, largely negatively biased debates about immigration, radicalization, the building of 
mosques, wearing the hijab, honour killings, and pretended foreign infiltration took place 
(e.g., Sarrazin 2010). 
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The present research 
This study aims at answering the question which of the three theorized models, threat 
model, legitimation model or hybrid model is most appropriate for the situation in Germany, 
where Muslims have been the largest immigrant group for almost half a century. Therefore, 
we apply latent variable cross-lagged modelling to a panel dataset gathered in Germany in 
2011. We measured perceived terrorist threat and derogation of Muslims twofold. This is 
because, as mentioned above, terrorist threat can be perceived on a collective and a personal 
level (e.g., Huddy et al. 2002) and derogation of Muslims can happen on attitudinal and 
behavioural level (e.g., Doosje et al. 2009). 
Whether collective and personal threat create differential effects is left open for 
exploration since earlier studies delivered contradictory results (Asbrock and Fritsche 2013; 
Huddy et al. 2005). To capture outgroup derogation of Muslims twofold, the panel included 
items that should measure prejudice and discriminatory intentions. Thus, we enlarge on 
Doosje and colleagues’ (2009) work showing terrorist threat to be connected to 
discriminatory intentions against Muslims. 
Regarding the context of the survey, it is important to state that two events happened 
close to the field period of this study. First, the German minister of internal affairs released an 
official terror warning for Germany two month before the field period began (Der Spiegel 
2010). Second, Bin-Laden was assassinated between t1 and t2. Thus, terrorism was on the 
agenda of mass media when this study was conducted, meaning it is likely that all 
participants were aware of the events. The mean score of participants’ perceived terrorist 
threat remained stable across t1 and t29. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Means: collective terrorist threat t1=3.18, t2=3.33, ΔM=.15 (p>.05); personal terrorist threat t1=2.15, t2=2.20, 
ΔM=.05 (p>.05). 
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Figure 1. Theoretical autoregressive model with potential cross-lagged paths 
 
 
Hypotheses. Figure 1 translates the theories above into a testable model. It shows a 
cross-lagged model with the theorized potential cross-lagged paths. If path ‘a’ reached 
significance, the threat model – threat creates devaluation – would be supported. A 
significant path ‘b’ would speak for a legitimation model – prejudices are legitimated by 
threat. A hybrid model would be supported if both paths (a & b) reach significance. 
 
Methods 
Statistical procedure. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equation 
Modelling (SEM) were used. The application of these procedures, especially if combined, is 
highly advantageous since measurement error is considered and modelled separately, leading 
to highly reliable estimates of relationships between constructs (Kline 2011). 
We deployed a robust maximum likelihood estimator in the software Mplus 7 
(Muthén and Muthén 2012). This estimator corrects standard errors for non-normality of the 
data but also corrects chi-square and model fit. Hence, an adaptation of the chi-square 
difference test for nested model comparisons is needed (Satorra and Bentler 2001). Missing 
data were handled via Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation (Arbuckle 
1996). However, since the panel attrition was large, only those who participated in both 
waves are considered for longitudinal analysis. 
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The specific longitudinal data modelling technique used is called autoregressive 
cross-lagged structural equation analysis (Jöreskog 1979). This model contains two or more 
variables with at least two measurement points (see Figure 1 for an example). The time 
ordering, meaning the independent variable being conducted before the dependent variable, is 
one of the central conditions to draw causal inferences from non-experimental data (Finkel 
1995). In a two-wave (t1 & t2), two variables example (Figure 1), both t2 variables are 
regressed on itself (autoregression) at t1 and the second variable at t1 (cross-lagged effects a 
& b). If some of the variance left in a t2 variable, after controlling for its autoregression, is 
explained by the second variable at t1, can this be interpreted as a causal link. However, the 
claim of causality depends on the assumption that the effect is not produced by a third 
variable (Finkel 1995). 
Sample. T1 measurement was conducted in January 2011. The invitation to 
participate in the online questionnaire was distributed via university email lists and social 
networks. The sample was split10. The relevant split for this study included N=755 cases. 
Because of insufficient data and migration background of participants, 193 cases had to be 
excluded, leaving a net sample of Nt1=562. The sample consisted of 59 per cent females, the 
average age was 28 years (SD=9.29) and the average education 7.22 (SD=.649), on a 1=‘no 
school-leaving qualifications” up to 8=‘university degree” scale, indicating a very high 
educational level. 
At the end of the questionnaire, respondents had the possibility to leave their email 
address for being invited to participate in a second wave of that questionnaire and to create a 
unique, anonymous code that enabled us to merge t1 and t2 data later on. 267 participants 
(35.3 per cent) provided their email addresses. 
                                                 
10 The survey included also several other research projects than the current one. 
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In June 2011, we invited the respondents via email to fill out the t2 questionnaire. The 
response rate was rather low with 40.3 per cent, leaving an N of 98 cases that answered t2. 
After excluding participants with migration background, a net sample of Nt2=88 remained. 
A logistic regression, including socio-demographics and the constructs relevant for 
this paper11 revealed that only age influenced the probability of participating in the second 
wave significantly. With increasing age, the probability of participating increased slightly 
(odds ratio = 1.025, p < .05, CI95 = 1.003/1.047). However, this is not an issue since later 
third variable analyses in the cross-lagged models of terrorist threat and Muslims’ derogation 
revealed no effects of age. 
Measures. Collective and personal terrorist threat were measured by two items each. 
The items were created by ourselves or partially derived from Frindte and Haußecker (2010, 
136). Collective terrorist threat was measured with the items: ‘Terror will find its way into 
Germany’ and ‘I think it is just a matter of time before Germany also becomes a scene of 
massive terrorist attacks’. Personal terrorist threat was measured by the agreement to the 
following statements: ‘I personally feel threatened by terrorist attacks” and ‘I am scared of 
terrorist attacks here in Germany’. 
The items measuring derogation of Muslims were derived from Leibold and Kühnel 
(2006, 142–44). We were careful in choosing items that do not trigger an association between 
terrorist threat and anti-Muslim prejudice. 
The items designated to measure anti-Muslim prejudice were: ‘Because of the many 
Muslims here, I sometimes feel like a stranger in my own country’, ‘Muslims should not be 
allowed to immigrate to Germany’ and ‘The many mosques in Germany show that here, too, 
Islam strives to extend its clout’. Discriminatory intention against Muslims was 
operationalized by three items: ‘I would just as well enrol my child in a school where a 
                                                 
11 Sociodemographics: age, gender, education; Other constructs: perceived personal & collective terrorist threat, 
derogation of Muslims. 
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Muslim woman teaches wearing a headscarf”, ‘I would have problems to move to an area 
where many Muslims live’ and ‘I will only vote for those parties that are against further 
immigration of Muslims’ (for a study using a similar operationalization of discriminatory 
intention see Doosje et al. 2009).  
All items were answered on a 1 = ‘fully agree’ to 7 = ‘fully disagree’ scale. Most of 
the items had to be recoded so that high scores consistently depict high threat, prejudice, or 
discriminatory intention. 
 
Results 
Personal and collective terrorist threat. Collective and personal terrorist threat are 
assumed to be distinct constructs, which was examined via CFA. A two factor model 
(χ²corrected=3.835, df=1, p=.0502, CFI=.997, RMSEA=.069, SRMR=.009) fit the data clearly 
better than a one factor solution (χ²corrected=44.207, df=2, p=.00, CFI=.939, RMSEA=.187, 
SRMR=.043; for model fit recommendations see Schermelleh-Engel, Mosbrugger, and 
Müller 2003). Although the two factor solution is more appropriate, the high correlation 
between collective and personal threat (r=.809, p<.001) is highly probable to induce 
multicollinearity issues in terms of unreliable estimates (Grewal, Cote, and Baumgartner 
2004). Therefore, we analyzed the effects of personal and collective terrorist threat 
separately. 
Anti-Muslim prejudice and discriminatory intention. Since we wanted to analyze 
the connection of terrorist threat with prejudice and also with discriminatory intention, we 
tested whether prejudice and discrimination are separable factors in our data. This proved to 
be untrue. The significant chi-square of the two factor solution (χ²corrected=28.762, df=8, 
p=.00, CFI=.984, RMSEA=.068, SRMR=.02) indicated an insufficient fit. The two factors 
correlated with r=.989 (p<.001). This almost perfect correlation clearly spoke for a one factor 
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solution. Hence, we decided to proceed with a conglomerate factor of prejudice and 
discriminatory intention12. This factor accounts for the finding that respondents did not 
distinguish between prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory intentions. In the process of 
forming this factor, one item13 had to be excluded due to causing various modification indices 
in the model. The final factor consisted of five items and reached a very good model fit 
(χ²corrected=4.539, df=5, p=.47, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.00, SRMR=.012). 
 
Table 1. Latent Means, Reliability, Correlations of Latent Factors at t1 
Construct Latent Mean 
(SD) 
1 2 3 
1. Collective 
terrorist threat 
3.416 (1.577) α = .762 
inter-item r=.626 
.809*** .555*** 
2. Personal 
terrorist threat 
2.264 (1.415)  α= .820 
inter-item r=.736 
.389*** 
3. Prej. & discr. 
Intention against 
Muslims 
2.857 (1.948)   α = .813 
Note. Collective and personal terrorist threat are measured with two items each. Therefore, 
inter-item correlations are presented in addition to Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient. Modelfit of 
the simultaneous confirmatory factor analysis: χ²(corrected)=28.504, df=24, p=.24, CFI=.997, 
RMSEA=.019, SRMR=.021. 
 
Table 1 shows the latent means, internal consistencies, and factor correlations of 
collective terrorist threat, personal terrorist threat, and prejudice & discriminatory intentions 
against Muslims at t1. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients and inter-item correlations indicated 
satisfactory reliability of the factors. Latent means and correlations are based on a 
simultaneous CFA. Personal and collective terrorist threat were substantially correlated with 
                                                 
12 We refer to this single factor measure as ‘prejudice & discriminatory intention’. 
13 ‘Muslims should not be allowed to immigrate to Germany”. 
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the factor prejudice & discriminatory intentions. The effect size of collective threat was 
somewhat higher than that of personal threat.  
 
Longitudinal analysis. As a precondition of longitudinal structure and mean 
modelling, the measurement model needs to remain invariant over time (Byrne, Shavelson, 
and Muthén 1989). All models reached scalar invariance (e.g., equal structure, factor 
loadings, intercepts): Collective terrorist threat (χ²corrected=4.415, df=4, p=.35, CFI=.998, 
RMSEA=.036, SRMR=.032), personal terrorist threat (χ²corrected=6.468, df=4, p=.17, 
CFI=.985, RMSEA=.084, SRMR=.053), and prejudice & discriminatory intention against 
Muslims (χ²corrected=43.553, df=33, p=.10, CFI=.977, RMSEA=.057, SRMR=.054). Hence, 
the condition to compare structural paths and also latent means is fulfilled (Byrne, Shavelson, 
and Muthén 1989). 
Cross-lagged models. We calculated separate models for collective and personal 
terrorist threat due to collinearity issues14. 
 
Figure 2. Cross-lagged model with collective terrorist threat 
 
Note. Measurement Models not shown. Standardized robust maximum likelihood 
coefficients. Modelfit: χ²(corrected) = 91.15, df = 76, p = .11, CFI =.975, RMSEA = .051, SRMR 
= .063.  
                                                 
14 The attempt to calculate a cross-lagged model including simultaneously collective and personal threat as well 
as the factor prejudice & discriminatory intention failed, as assumed, due to collinearity issues. Resulting 
regression weights and standard errors showed strong signs of unreliability. 
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Figure 2 shows the cross-lagged model of collective terrorist threat and anti-Muslim 
prejudice & discrimination. The autocorrelations of both factors were fairly high suggesting a 
rather low amount of change over time. As the threat model hypothesized, only the cross-
lagged path from collective terrorist threat to anti-Muslim prejudice and discriminatory 
intention reached significance (β=.187, p<.05). Hence, perceiving collective terrorist threat at 
t1 predicts being prejudiced at t2. Alternative hypotheses are not supported. 
 
Figure 3. Cross-lagged model with personal terrorist threat 
 
Note. Measurement Models not shown. Standardized robust maximum likelihood 
coefficients. Modelfit: χ²(corrected) = 84.955, df = 71, p = .2118, CFI =.984, RMSEA = .042, 
SRMR = .076. 
 
Identical testing for personal terrorist threat (Figure 3) revealed congruent results. 
Personal terrorist threat was also antecedent to anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination. 
Since no differential effects of personal and collective threat occurred, we created a 
second order factor of terrorist threat. Due to the rather small sample size, we aimed at 
reducing the complexity of the model and therefore decided to create composite measures (so 
called parcels; see Little et al. 2002) of collective and personal terrorist threat. They were 
then used as indicators for the higher-level terrorist threat factor. Next we tested whether 
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longitudinal invariance was given, which proved to be true (scalar invariance: 
χ²corrected=2.648, df=4, p=.62, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.00, SRMR=.031). 
 
Figure 4. Cross-lagged model with terrorist threat (second order) 
 
Note. Measurement Models not shown Standardized robust maximum likelihood coefficients. 
Modelfit: χ²(corrected) = 93.640, df = 74, p = .613, CFI =.969, RMSEA = .059, SRMR = .07.  
 
Figure 4 shows that the model with the parcelled second order factor of terrorist threat 
replicates the finding that terrorist threat is antecedent to prejudice and discriminatory 
intention. To reduce the probability of a third-variable effect we included the control 
variables gender, age, and education into the model. The cross-lagged effects remained robust 
against those controls but the model fit became worse (χ²corrected=121.138, df=88, p=.011, 
CFI=.95, RMSEA=.07, SRMR=.063). None of the control variables had a significant 
influence on the dependent variables at t2. 
In summary, the threat model hypothesis that terrorist threat is antecedent to prejudice 
& discriminatory intention against Muslims is supported for collective and personal terrorist 
threat separately and for a parcelled second order factor of terrorist threat. No indications for 
a legitimation model or a hybrid model were found. 
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Discussion 
In this research, we aimed at clarifying the temporal antecedence of perceived 
terrorist threat and derogation of Muslims in the German context. In addition, we were 
interested in the role of the subcomponents of terrorist threat (personal and collective) and 
derogation of Muslims (prejudice and discriminatory intention). In a first step we studied the 
cross-sectional relations of these variables and figured out that terrorist threat and Muslims’ 
derogation are substantially correlated. For testing the longitudinal antecedence, we derived 
three testable models from theory. The threat model hypothesis, saying that terrorist threat is 
causally antecedent to prejudice & discriminatory intention, was supported. No support for 
the legitimation model – meaning that terrorist threat is used as legitimation for expressing 
existing prejudice – was found, although it seemed to be a conceivable model for the specific 
situation in Germany. The theorized hybrid model was not supported either. Thus, anti-
Muslim prejudice and the intention to discriminate Muslims in Germany are at least partially 
driven by the relatively new phenomenon of perceived terrorist threat. We conclude that 
terrorist threat is primarily perceived as a real threat, triggering outgroup derogation as a 
defence mechanism. 
In this study, personal and collective terrorist threat had no differential effects on 
derogation of Muslims. Huddy and colleagues (2005), however, reported an association of 
anti-Arab policy preferences only for collective threat, not for personal threat15. Asbrock and 
Fritsche (2013) showed in an experimental study that personal, but not collective threat was 
connected with ethnocentric reactions. In another context, Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner, and 
Stellmacher (2007) found that the effect of personal threat on prejudice was fully mediated by 
collective threat. Those diverse results clearly indicate that more research needs to be done to 
clarify structure and effects of terrorist threat. 
                                                 
15 Personal threat is called ‘anxiety’ in their study but the factor includes items that are similar or same to those 
capturing personal terrorist threat. 
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Limitations and future research. We acknowledge several shortcomings of this 
study. Our sample consisted mainly of highly educated young respondents, which could limit 
the generalizability of our findings. Future research should therefore try to replicate our 
findings in representative samples. Another improvement could be reached by conducting 
more than two measurement waves, which would also allow for testing longitudinal 
mediation. 
Longitudinal data are clearly better suited to reveal causal relations of constructs than 
cross-sectional data. However, one of the conditions to test causal directions of relationships 
within a longitudinal model is that a possible third-variable effect can be excluded (Finkel 
1995). This condition can never be guaranteed due to the infinite number of third variables. It 
can only be minimized by considering theoretically relevant variables. The amount of third 
variables was rather limited in this study. Future studies should either consider more third 
variables or make use of experimental designs to substantiate our finding of terrorist threat 
being the cause for the devaluation of Muslims. 
Another shortcoming is that prejudice and discriminatory intention are not 
discriminant in this study as for instance hypothesized by the theory of planned behaviour 
(Ajzen and Fishbein 1977). This could be the consequence of the question wording for 
discriminatory intentions against Muslims, which may have been too similar to attitude items. 
To legitimate the claim that our results are also valid for discriminatory intention we 
calculated another cross-lagged model, using terrorist threat and the strongest behavioural 
intention item ‘I will only vote for those parties that are against further immigration of 
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Muslims’. Only the cross-lagged path from terrorist threat to anti-Muslim immigration voting 
reached significance16, supporting our claim. 
Furthermore, future research should deal with the change in quality of stereotypes. 
The assumption is that the stereotypes of Muslims have changed vastly in response to 9/11. 
Such a phenomenon was observed for Americans’ stereotypes of Japanese, when Japan 
attacked Pearl Harbor in World War II (Seago 1947). 
Implications. Because terrorist threat is antecedent of Muslims’ derogation, the 
perception of threat needs to be reduced (e.g., Breckenridge and Zimbardo 2007). Sunstein 
(2003, 121) stated: ‘When strong emotions are involved, people tend to focus on the badness 
of the outcome, rather than on the probability that the outcome will occur.’ Therefore, it is 
one approach to educate citizens about the low probability of becoming a victim of a terrorist 
attack. This, however, is a difficult undertaking, especially in the aftermath of an attack. 
A different approach is to inform people about the causes of Islamist terrorism which 
enables them making sense out of the negative experience (Fischer et al. 2011). Fischer and 
colleagues experimentally manipulated terrorist threat and the provision of background 
information about terrorists’ motives. If meaning was provided in the high threat condition, 
participants felt less threatened. 
Jonas and Fritsche (2013) suggest to strengthen cultural environments (subjectively 
meaningful groups, volunteer organizations) since they can buffer threat. Fischer and 
colleagues (2006) argue in the same manner that intrinsic religiousness decreases threat 
perceptions. They showed that experimentally induced terrorist threat affected only non-
religious individuals’ mood. This effect was mediated by self-efficacy. 
In addition to reducing and buffering the perception of threat, the association of 
‘Muslims’ and ‘terrorism’ needs to be diminished. This aim can only be reached if mass 
                                                 
16 Beta=.164, p<.05; Model fit: χ²(corrected)=6.327, df=8, p=.6106, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.00, SRMR=.029. Full 
model results upon request. 
Manuscript #2 
 
95 
 
media stops presenting Muslims primarily in the context of fanaticism and terrorism (e.g., 
Shaheen 2003). Furthermore, opinion leaders need to emphasize the inadmissibility of the 
existing association between Muslims and terrorism (Allen 2004). 
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Abstract 
This research contributes to the debate whether real world terrorist threat leads to a 
conservative shift (conservative shift hypothesis) or to an intensification of preexisting 
political ideologies (ideological intensification hypothesis). I applied a research design 
suggested by Castano et al. (2011; Study 1) to a representative panel data set (t1=April 2003; 
t2=April 2004) that contained the Madrid Bombings of March 2004. The analysis of residual 
and latent true change scores reveals that change in authoritarian submission, one facet of 
right-wing authoritarianism, and prejudice, depend on political self-placement at t1. No mean 
shift at all occurs but leftists get less authoritarian and less prejudiced whereas centrists and 
rightists increase in these attitudes. These results support the ideological intensification 
hypothesis. However, they show also that centrists – the largest group of Germans – are 
getting more conservative after an attack. Thus, ideological intensification does occur, 
whereas there is also a high potential for a conservative shift on mean level. 
 
Keywords: Madrid Bombings, terrorism, conservative shift, worldview defense, latent true 
change modeling 
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Introduction. After the attacks on the US in September 2001 (9/11) a shock went 
through the Western World. Facilitated by the mass media, terrorists succeeded in spreading 
a climate of threat by increasing the salience of death (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007). 
Shortly after the attacks, pollsters measured an increase of threat perceptions even in 
countries other than the US (e.g., European Commission, 2002; Noelle-Neumann, 2002). The 
same spillover effect was observed in Germany when on March 11, 2004, several train-
bombings occurred in Spain’s capital, Madrid, leaving 191 dead and more than two thousand 
injured. In consequence, a month after the attack, 57% of respondents were afraid of possible 
terrorist attacks in Germany, compared to only 29% in January 2004 (e.g., IFD Allensbach, 
2004, see also Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2004a, 2004b). 
Terrorist threats like these trigger individuals to contemplate their death (Das, 
Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009; Landau et al., 2004) causing a possible 
shift in their political ideological beliefs. This research note analyzes how a major terrorist 
attack affects ideological beliefs within individuals. Several scholars hypothesize a 
conservative shift to occur after a major terrorist attack (e.g., Bonanno & Jost, 2006). 
Examining whether the entire society makes a shift to the right after a geographically close, 
major terrorist attack does not only make a contribution to an ongoing scientific debate. It is 
particularly important since especially right-wing ideologies are highly connected to the 
devaluation of minorities (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998) which can lead, in the context of terrorism, 
to pro-war and anti-immigrant attitudes (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005) or even 
backlash hate crimes, as seen in the US after 9/11 (e.g., Kaplan, 2006).  
In this paper I connect to a debate occurring between Conservatism as Motivated Social 
Cognition (MSC) researchers (e.g., Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) and Terror 
Management Theory (TMT) advocates (e.g., Greenberg, et al., 1990). Whereas Jost and 
colleagues (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2003) suggest a collective conservative shift to 
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occur after a major terrorist attack, Pyszczynski, Solomon and Greenberg (2003) argue that 
the existential threat imposed by terrorism intensifies preexisting ideologies on the individual 
level which can lead to a nullification of effects on the aggregate level (see also Huddy & 
Feldman, 2011). 
Until now, only a few studies have examined changes in ideological beliefs in response 
to major terrorist attacks. Furthermore, this is only done for countries that faced an attack 
themselves (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006; Nagoshi, Terrell, & Nagoshi, 
2007; Nail & McGregor, 2009). I extend the existing literature by building on previous 
experimental research (Castano et al., 2011) applied to a real-world event that increases 
death-salience. Several aspects of this paper need to be emphasized. In terms of content, 
conservatism and prejudice are examined. I use a large scale representative panel data set 
where the second wave of conduction occurred a month after the Madrid Bombings. 
Furthermore, results of the initial analysis are replicated and confirmed by using an 
elaborated longitudinal latent variable approach. 
 
Theory and Previous Research. 
Conservatism. The idea that conservatism as a political ideology is better suited to deal 
with threat and uncertainty goes back to Adorno and colleagues (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, 
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950, p. 2). This thought was recently refined in Jost and colleagues’ 
motivated social cognition model of conservatism where they proposed that “conservatism 
[…] serves to reduce fear, anxiety, and uncertainty; to avoid change, disruption, and 
ambiguity” (Jost et al., 2003, p. 340). In their theory, the authors stress that conservatism is 
not a personality variable only but includes also dynamic aspects, especially when it comes to 
contextual threat. They assume contextual threat leading to cognitive simplicity, appearing as 
conservative black and white thinking. Thus, conservatism is suggested to be a strategy to 
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deal with threat. The expected outcome of broadly perceived external threat, e.g., induced by 
a major terrorist attack, should be a conservative shift (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Nail 
& McGregor, 2009). 
 Adorno and colleagues’ as well as Jost and colleagues’ work has been sharply 
criticized for their suggestion that conservatism is individuals’ universal solution in dealing 
with threat and uncertainty (Eysenck, 1999/1954; Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). The major 
criticism is, in a nutshell, that liberal or left-wing political orientations can serve the same 
purposes in coping with threat and uncertainty as conservatism does. An external, threatening 
event could consequently lead to ideological intensification on both sides, which could 
nullify each other out on mean level. This view is also shared by most scholars of terror 
management theory. 
Terror Management Theory (TMT) is a threat theory coping with the existential fear 
to die, also called mortality salience. TMT goes back to the observation that every living 
creature has a will to survive but only humans are aware of the finiteness of life (Becker, 
1997/1973). This knowledge is highly threatening. Being part of a meaningful shared reality 
with homogenous ideologies can then be an anxiety buffer. After contemplating their own 
death, people increase their faith in their worldview (Greenberg et al., 1990), which means an 
intensification of preexisting political ideologies (Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, 
& Chatel, 1992). In the following, I refer to the worldview defense view as ideological 
intensification hypothesis (see Huddy & Feldman, 2011). 
Previous Research. The conservative shift vs. the ideological intensification debate 
produced a plethora of studies (see Burke, Kosloff, & Landau, 2013, for a meta-analysis). For 
instance, Jost and colleagues (2007) showed in three cross-sectional, correlational studies that 
death anxiety contributes to conservatism only; the authors could not show support for 
alternative models like the ideological intensification hypothesis. On the other hand 
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McGregor and colleagues (1998) showed experimentally that mortality salience led to a 
derogation and even aggression against people with opposed political ideologies. This 
aggression was expressed in form of the allocation of vile hot sauce which was significantly 
higher for people having an opposite ideology. The list of studies supporting each side could 
be further prolonged. However, even the above mentioned meta-analysis by Burke et al. 
(2013) delivered no clear-cut support for one of the hypotheses. The authors gathered 31 
experimental studies where participants in the experimental conditions contemplated their 
own death. The dependent measures included, among others, support for conservative 
leaders, use of military force, and conservative policies and attitudes. Although the average 
effect size of the ideological intensification hypothesis was larger (r=.35), compared to 
conservative shift (r=.22), they did not differ significantly. 
The controversy of conservative shift versus ideological intensification was empirically 
conducted primarily on the basis of studies focusing on mortality salience in general. Only a 
few papers examined in the first place the impact of terrorist attacks on political ideologies 
(Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Nail & McGregor, 2009). Some more 
studies (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006; Fischer, Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, 
Frey, & Oßwald, 2007; Nagoshi et al., 2007) measured Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; 
Altemeyer, 1998) as dependent variable, which is often used as a proxy for conservatism 
(e.g., Castano et al., 2011; Jost, Fitzsimons, & Kay, 2004), were conducted coincidentally 
before, after, or while an attack happened. For instance, Nail and McGregor (2009) found in 
independent samples, one conducted pre 9/11, the other post 9/11, that the attitudes in the 
post sample were more pro Bush and pro increasing military spending. Echebarria-Echabe 
and Fernandez-Guede (2006) present the same design with the Madrid Bombings enclosed. 
They find RWA and several prejudice measures increased in the post-attack sample. Most of 
the results of studies conducted in the context of terror can be interpreted as showing a 
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conservative shift. Only Huddy and Feldman (2011) interpret their analysis of the 2000 vs. 
2002 US General Social Survey as counterargument for a conservative shift since they found 
no indications for increased conservatism in 2002. However, with their cross-sectional data, 
they can only show that no sustainable conservative shift occurred. They cannot support the 
ideological intensification hypothesis. Therefore, within subject designs are needed to 
uncover the process of ideological intensification. 
Castano et al. (2011; Study 1 & 2) run experiments with liberal undergraduates to see 
how their ideological beliefs change when they are confronted with death thoughts. 
Participants first had to position themselves politically on a liberal to conservative scale. The 
few that positioned themselves as center or right were excluded from the analysis and the 
remaining respondents filled in a RWA measure as a proxy for conservatism. Then they were 
allocated to either the experimental condition where they answered questions about their own 
death (mortality salience) or the control condition. Afterwards all participants were asked to 
fill in the RWA scale again because the data was allegedly lost by a computer error. The data 
analysis was done with the residuals of t2 regressed on t1, meaning the change of RWA 
between the time points. Respondents in the mortality salience condition had a negative sum 
of residuals which implies that their RWA scores decreased over time. Furthermore, this 
score was significantly lower in the treatment condition compared to the control condition, 
which indicates that the respondents became more liberal due to the mortality salience 
manipulation. In a conceptual replication with specific policies being surveyed, Castano et al. 
showed that participants (only liberals again) in the mortality salience condition displayed 
less support for conservative policies compared to the control condition. 
I extend the literature by applying Castano et al.’s (2011) within-subject panel design 
(but without control condition) to a large scale, representative panel data set where the post 
measure was conducted soon after one of the major terrorist attacks of the last decade. This is 
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unique, since previous research on terrorist attacks as natural experiments had to face several 
shortcomings in data quality or timing. Either they were convenient samples or consisted 
entirely of students (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006; Fischer et al., 2007; 
Nagoshi et al., 2007; Nail & McGregor, 2009) or, if representative surveys were available, 
scholars had to accept cross-sectional designs and large gaps between the measurement points 
and the event (e.g., Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Kam & Kinder, 2007).  
 
The Present Research 
Conservative Shift vs. Ideological Intensification. In the present research, I examined 
whether the Madrid Bombings led to a conservative shift or ideological intensification in 
Germany. Like Castano et al. (2011) I use RWA as a proxy for conservatism (see also Jost et 
al., 2003, 2004). Furthermore, this analysis is enlarged upon prejudice, in order to explore 
whether terrorist threat manifests itself in the devaluation of foreigners. 
In terms of data analysis, I first applied T-tests to look for a mean shift in RWA. 
Second, I calculated and analyzed residuals as change scores. Third, to check for the 
robustness of the findings of step 2, I applied Latent True Change (LTC) modeling, which 
creates difference scores that are free of measurement error. 
Since the dataset comprehends not only left-wingers, as was the case in Castano et al.’s 
(2011) data, I categorized respondents across their political self-positioning at t1 (left, center, 
right). A conservative shift would express itself in a significantly increased sample mean of 
RWA over time (H1). The ideological intensification hypothesis would be supported if no 
mean shift occurs and left-wingers residual scores are negative and right-wingers are positive 
(H2). 
Data. Data from the project ‘Group Focused Enmity in Germany’ (GFE; Zick et al., 
2008) were used. Sample size was Nt1 = 1140 in 2003, and Nt2 = 804 (70% of the 2003 
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sample) in 2004. Panel mortality was unsystematic (Christ, 2006). Data conduction took 
place from mid-April until mid-June via computer-assisted telephone interviews. The 
oversampling of the smaller eastern part of Germany is corrected via weighing. After 
weighing, the sample is representative for the 16 years and older German autochthonous 
society. 
Measures. Respondents positioned themselves on a left (1) to right (5) scale, which is 
comparable to the American liberal to conservative dimension. For reasons of simplicity, the 
1 to 5 scale was condensed to 1=left, 2=center, 3=right1. The dataset comprised two aspects 
of RWA (Altemeyer, 1998) measured by two items each: authoritarian submission, which is 
the unconditional subordination to ingroup authorities (“One of the most important attitudes 
that someone should have is obedience and respect for superiors”; “We should be grateful for 
leading heads who tell us what to do”); and authoritarian aggression, which reflects the need 
to punish those deviating from ingroup norms (“Crime should be punished more harshly”; 
“To keep order, one should take more rigorous action against outsiders and trouble makers”). 
Prejudice was measured by two items: “There are too many foreigners living in Germany” 
and “When jobs get scarce, the foreigners living in Germany should be sent (back) home”. 
The response scale reached from 1 = ‘fully agree’ to 4 = ‘fully disagree’. 
Procedure. Respondents participated in a panel study in April 2003 and April 2004 that 
included questions about various topics. The attacks on Madrid happened in March 2004 and 
were still salient when t2 was conducted (e.g., IFD Allensbach, 2004). The panel comprised 
the three constructs introduced above. Except the fact that in a natural experiment no control 
group is available, the existing data enabled me to replicate the design of study 1 from 
Castano et al.’s (2011) paper. At t1, participants positioned themselves politically and 
                                                 
1 Left (1) and rather left (2) were summarized as left. Center (3) remained center. Rather right (4) and right (5) 
were summarized as right. 
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responded to RWA and prejudice items. At t2, shortly after the bombing, participants again 
responded to RWA and prejudice items. 
 
Results 
A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) of RWA revealed that a two-factor solution 
(χ²corrected=2.158, df =1, p =.14, CFI=.999, RMSEA=.031, SRMR=.007) is clearly preferable 
over one factor (χ²corrected=128.842, df=2, p=.00, CFI=.859, RMSEA=.232, SRMR=.065). 
Thus, authoritarian aggression (t1: α=.778, r=.641; t2 α=.779, r=.639) and authoritarian 
submission (t1: α=671, r=.507; t2: α=.714, r=.557) are analyzed separately in further steps 
(referred to as RWAAggr and RWASubm). The prejudice scale reached satisfactory reliability 
(t1: α=.774, r=.635; t2: α=.768, r=.628). 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of left-right self-positioning 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the political self-positioning. More than half of the 
respondents (59%) considered themselves to be centrist, 28.4% said they were left-wing and 
only 12.6% said they were right-wing.  
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First, T-tests were calculated to estimate overall mean change in authoritarianism. No 
such change was found for RWASubm (ΔM=-.004, t(810)=-.212, p > .05) and RWAAggr 
(ΔM=.022, t(806)=1.117, p > .05). The same was true for prejudice (ΔM=-.027, t(808)=-
1.337, p > .05). This speaks against a conservative shift (H1). 
 
Figure 2. Longitudinal change in authoritarian submission 
 
Note. The figure shows only the middle section of the y-axis. The full range of residual 
scores is -2.53 to 1.73. Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction. **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
 
Next I calculated change scores (unstandardized residuals) by running t2 on t1 
regressions for each factor. Figure 2 shows the residual means for the left, center, and right. 
As predicted by the ideological intensification hypothesis, leftists decreased in RWASubm, 
whereas rightists increased, F(2, 799)=8.843, p<.001. Centrists showed almost the same 
effect as rightists did. This pattern speaks for an ideological intensification in authoritarian 
submission (H2). 
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Figure 3. Longitudinal change in authoritarian aggression 
 
Note. The figure shows only the middle section of the y-axis. The full range of residual 
scores is -2.26 to 1.46. No significant differences found. 
 
A similar pattern occurred for RWAAggr (see Figure 3) but without reaching 
significance, F(2, 795)=1.362, p>.05. Thus, ideological intensification did not apply to both 
aspects of RWA. RWAAggr was therefore not included in further analysis. 
Prejudice showed the same pattern as RWASubm and reached significance, F(2, 
796)=5.442, p<.01. Since the results in both RWASubm and prejudice were not different for 
centrists and rightists, further analysis considered only two categories of political self-
placement (left vs. center-right). 
 
To check the robustness of these findings, I applied a more elaborated procedure in 
dealing with longitudinal differences, called Latent True Change (LTC) modeling (McArdle 
& Hamagami, 2001; Steyer, Eid, & Schwenkmezger, 1997). The model estimation was done 
with the software Mplus 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012) using a robust maximum likelihood 
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estimator. Missing values were considered via Full-Information-Likelihood-Estimation 
(FIML; Arbuckle, 1996).  
The basis of the model is a time-invariant latent factor. Invariance means that the 
measurement model remains stable across time (Meredith, 1993). Therefore, a simultaneous 
confirmatory factor analysis with the two measurement points of the same factor is run. 
Autocorrelations of measurement errors are modeled as indicator specific error factors (Eid, 
Schneider, & Schwenkmezger, 1999). The well-fitting factors of authoritarian submission 
(χ²corrected=2.354, df=4, p=.67, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.00, SRMR=.009) and prejudice 
(χ²corrected=1.307, df=4, p=.86, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.00, SRMR=.014) reached strict scalar 
invariance which is the best of three possible stages of invariance. In a next step, a simple 
restatement of the model creates the latent true change factor. The t2 variable is perfectly 
regressed on the t1 variable and the LTC factor. Thereby, the intraindividual variance as well 
as the mean vector of change are redirected into the LTC factor. The mean of the LTC factor 
is the latent mean difference between t1 and t2 and the variance is the intraindividual latent 
change. 
Figure 4. Latent true change model of RWASubm predicted by political ideology 
 
Note. Y-variable standardized robust maximum likelihood estimator. Modelfit: 
χ²corrected=3.758, df=6, p=.71, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.00, SRMR=.01. 
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Figure 5. Latent true change model of prejudice predicted by political ideology 
 
Note. Y-variable standardized robust maximum likelihood estimator. Modelfit: 
χ²corrected=5.25, df=6, p=.51, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.00, SRMR=.012 
 
The mean difference of RWASubm between t1 and t2 was ΔM=.00, p>.05. The 
significant variance of the change factor (σ²=.178; p<.001) indicated that there was 
intraindividual movement over time. Figure 4 shows the LTC model with the left vs. center-
right dummy included. The correlation between RWASubm at t1 and the ideological dummy 
variable (r=.276, p<.001) indicated that the initial level of RWASubm and political self-
placement are positively connected. The structural path of RWASubm t1 on its LTC factor (β=-
.281, p<.001) indicated that high initial values are connected to less change, which is pretty 
common in such models. Finally, the dummy variable had a significant effect on the LTC of 
RWASubm (β=.152, p<.01)2. This can be interpreted as a moderation effect, meaning political 
self-placement moderated the direction of change in RWASubm. When holding the effect of 
RWASubm t1 constant, the latent mean for leftists is -.100 and for center-rightists .044 with the 
difference (b=.144, p < .01) being significant. Exactly the same model description held for 
                                                 
2 Mplus offers the possibility to standardize dependent variables only for cases in which dummy variables are 
used as independent variables. Beta is the standardized change in y if the dummy changes from 0 to 1 (see 
Muthén and Muthén, 2012, pp. 721–724).  
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the LTC of prejudice (Figure 5). No shift in mean (ΔM = .036, p > .05) but significant 
variance over time (σ² = .178; p < .001), which is partly explained by the political self-
placement dummy (β=.131, p < .01). The latent mean for leftists is -.095 and for rightists .036 
with b=.131, p<.05. Thus, the application of measurement error free LTC modeling strongly 
supported former findings.  
 
Discussion 
In this research I contributed to the debate whether a major terrorist attack leads to a 
conservative shift or ideological intensification. I applied the research design of Castano and 
colleagues (2011; Study 1) to a large scale representative German panel dataset that included 
the Madrid Bombings in between the two measurement occasions. Castano et al. found in 
their exclusively liberal sample that those exposed to mortality salience decreased in 
authoritarianism. This result could be replicated in this study. Furthermore, this study shows 
that right-wingers and also centrists develop in the opposed direction compared to leftists, 
leaving the sample mean stable. Thus, this effect can only be captured with longitudinal and 
experimental designs but remains unnoticed in all large scale, cross-sectional surveys (e.g., 
Huddy & Feldman, 2011). 
The fact that rightists and centrist show a similar development is highly interesting 
because, consequently, the group of those becoming more conservative after an attack is 
much larger than the group of those becoming less conservative. This fits Greenberg and 
Jonas’ (2003) idea that today’s capitalist states have much more right-wing than left-wing 
potential. According to the authors, this increases the probability that an ideological 
intensification remains unnoticed and a conservative shift is measured instead, simply due to 
the numerical superiority of center-rightists. Although the group of center-rightists is much 
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larger in this representative German sample, the sample mean remains stable. This is because 
the effect in leftists is stronger than in center-rightists. 
It is somewhat astonishing that no effects in change of authoritarian aggression could be 
measured since other researchers found a strong link of terrorist threat and the need to punish 
others (e.g., Fischer et al., 2007). Researchers should in general check the factorial structure 
of RWA and look for differential effects of the RWA components (see Duckitt & Bizumic, 
2013)3. Nevertheless, the effect in authoritarian submission is perfectly plausible. Whereas 
center-rightists may wish to have a strong leader in a situation of crisis, leftists may worry 
about the abuse of the increased power that political leaders have in these periods.  
 
Limitations 
The possibility that the intraindividual change over time is due to other events or 
developments in that period cannot be fully excluded. Anyhow, with 11-M being the first 
major Islamist terrorist attack close to Germany and with terrorist threat measures showing 
increased scores during the time of conduction (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2004a, 2004b; 
IFD Allensbach, 2004), it seems highly plausible that the attacks caused the systematic 
variance revealed in this paper. 
Like Castano et al., 2011, this paper faces the critique that RWA is not a perfect 
measurement of conservatism (e.g., Crowson, Thoma, & Hestevold, 2005). We acknowledge 
this shortcoming but point to the fact that this is a secondary analysis of an available dataset. 
Moreover, additional research needs to be done to figure out how the effect looks like 
immediately after an attack, how long-lasting such an effect is and if it generalizes across 
                                                 
3 In terms of data analysis, processing RWA as a single factor (in opposite to the results of the CFA) would have 
shown a significant effect from political self-placement to the change in RWA. This effect however, was driven 
only by authoritarian submission as the subsequent separate analysis showed.  
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countries. Furthermore the question comes up whether the same pattern would occur if the 
focus country itself was hit by a major attack. 
 
Conclusion 
Three conclusions can be drawn from the present study. First, the results of Castano et 
al., 2011 hold even true in a large scale, representative panel data set. This means that 11-M 
led to an ideological intensification instead of a conservative shift in Germany. Second, those 
categorizing themselves as centrists, which is the largest group of Germans in this sample, 
react in the same way as rightists do – they are getting more conservative after an attack. 
Thus, the potential for a conservative shift on average mean level is pretty high. Third, the 
effect of ideological intensification is stronger in leftists.
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2. Final Discussion 
As outlined in the introduction, a new threat to Western countries and their citizens 
arose with 9/11. With their terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the 
Pentagon, Islamist terrorists killed thousands of people and destroyed landmarks of Western 
capitalism and power. By doing so, they conveyed terror far beyond those directly affected by 
the attacks (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007). The new threat posed by Islamist terrorism had 
far reaching consequences for politics (e.g., Huddy, Feldman, & Weber, 2007) but also for 
individuals’ psychological health (Ahern, Galea, Resnick, & Vlahov, 2004; Marshall et al., 
2007). The present research aimed at shedding light onto further consequences of Islamist 
terrorism and the resulting threat: first, consequences for intergroup relations between 
Western majority societies and Muslim immigrants (Manuscripts #1 and #2) and second, 
changes in political ideologies in response to a major terrorist attack (Manuscript #3). In the 
following section, I discuss theoretical, empirical, and methodological advances as well as the 
potential for practical interventions following from the results. Thereafter, I give an outlook 
on future research. 
 
2.1 Perceived Terrorist Threat and Anti-Muslim Backlash (Manuscripts #1 & #2) 
In this research, my co-authors and I were able to show that perceived terrorist threat on 
a micro level leads to derogation of Muslims (Manuscript #2). Furthermore, this micro-level 
process can become an anti-Muslim backlash on a macro level, if specific marginal conditions 
are given (Manuscript #1). In the first manuscript, we theorized a model from Integrated 
Threat Theory (ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) and research connecting prejudice with 
discrimination (e.g., Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 2008). However, that model was not testable 
with the available data. Therefore, we tested in Manuscript #2 the connection of perceived 
terrorist threat and derogation of Muslims on a micro-level. In addition to simply testing the 
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connection of those two variables, we delivered evidence for the causal antecedence of 
perceived terrorist threat to derogation of Muslims. The finding from that study that perceived 
terrorist threat predicts anti-Muslim prejudice is in line with ITT. It furthermore supports 
Levine and Campbell’s (1972) assumption that the hostility of the majority is directed to the 
perceived source of threat, which is also concordant with several scapegoating approaches 
(Allport, 1979/1954; Glick, 2002, 2005). 
The aforementioned test of causal antecedence of perceived terrorist threat and 
derogation of Muslims is unique, to our knowledge. Several studies (Das, Bushman, Bezemer, 
Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009; Doosje, Zimmermann, Küpper, Zick, & Meertens, 2009; 
Oswald, 2005) adopted the view that perceived terrorist threat produces prejudice against 
Muslims but none of them validated that assumption. Ibish (2003) assumed that the 9/11 
backlash was an expression of existing prejudice. In the same way, Allen (2004) argued that 
Islamist terrorism is used as justification to express existing prejudice (for a theoretical 
account, see Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Das et al. (2009) 
showed that an experimental terrorist threat manipulation led to increased prejudice. 
However, this design was not able to answer the question if individuals really increased in 
prejudice or if only the expression of existing prejudice increased. We closed this gap by 
applying latent variable cross-lagged models (Jöreskog, 1979) to that research question 
(Manuscript #2). The results clearly indicate that perceived terrorist threat produces prejudice 
and discriminatory intention against Muslims. An answer to that research question was 
especially important because it allows to develop appropriate intervention strategies. In 
Manuscript #2, some promising strategies are discussed to diminish the perception of terrorist 
threat. In a nutshell, individuals need to be aware about the low probability of becoming a 
victim (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007; Sunstein, 2003), they should learn more about the 
motives of terrorists (Fischer, Postmes, Koeppl, Conway, & Fredriksson, 2011), and they 
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should be embedded in subjectively meaningful groups because this can buffer threat (Jonas 
& Fritsche, 2013). 
A shared implication from Manuscript #1 and #2 is the demand that mass media needs 
to stop associating Muslims with terrorism (Poole & Richardson, 2006; Richardson, 
2009/2004; Shaheen, 2003). In Manuscript #1, we derived this implication from the 
assessment that the probability of threat becoming prejudice and discrimination is higher in 
countries where Muslims are mainly presented in the context of terrorism in mass media. 
Another implication of Manuscript #1 is that a call for differentiation between peaceful living 
Muslims and terrorists by political and religious elites can prevent backlash. However, in case 
of 9/11 in the US, Presidents Bush’s call for differentiation led to decreased prejudice against 
Muslims but did not prevent violence against them. One reason for this fact is that Bush made 
his call for differentiation ten days after 9/11 and most of the violent discrimination against 
Muslims happened already in the very days after 9/11. When the attacks on the UK occurred 
on July 7, 2005 (7/7), an immediate call for differentiation could not prevent an increase in 
prejudice and discrimination (EUMC, 2005). Thus, in case of 7/7 in the UK our theorized 
model fit the data insofar as threat, prejudice and discrimination increased. A similar pattern 
with only slight increases in reported discriminatory acts was found for the Madrid Bombings 
on March 11, 2004 (11-M) in Spain. Hence, the macro development of perceived terrorist 
threat, anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination after a major attack can be predicted by a 
social psychological micro level model if several marginal conditions are fulfilled. For all 
minor events considered in Manuscript #1 only increases in threat but no consequences in 
prejudice and discrimination were recorded. Additional interesting findings are that 9/11 led 
to increases in discrimination against Muslims across all focus countries in terms of spillover 
effects (Allen & Nielsen, 2002) and that 7/7 led to increases in anti-Muslim prejudice in all 
European focus countries. 
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Time series analyses (e.g., ARIMA; Box, Jenkins, & Reinsel, 2008) were not applicable 
to the data in Manuscript #1 mainly due to the irregularity of conduction. Furthermore, using 
stochastic differential equations (e.g., Reinecke, Schmidt, & Weick, 2005) was also not 
possible with this kind of data. Only one of the repeated cross-section time series provided 
two items measuring anti-Muslim prejudice. We used this surplus in data quality and tested 
the invariance of the measurement (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989; Meredith, 1993). By 
doing so, we determined that the meaning of anti-Muslim prejudice remained stable in 
Germany between 2003 and 2011. Thus, neither 11-M, 7/7, nor any other terror related event 
changed the factor structure of anti-Muslim prejudice. To our knowledge, there is no other 
study showing measurement invariance of anti-Muslim prejudice over such a time span. 
However, it would have been highly interesting to have a latent measurement of anti-Muslim 
prejudice in Germany pre and post 9/11. If this had been the case, we would have been able to 
evaluate whether the mean and/or the full measurement model changed due to 9/11. However, 
to our knowledge, no such data set exists. 
 
2.2 Perceived Terrorist Threat and Changing Political Ideologies (Manuscript #3) 
By choosing New York, Madrid, and London as target cities, last decade’s terrorists 
ensured not only that many people fell victim but also that camera teams were at the scene 
within minutes (Shurkin, 2007). The pictures of falling bodies and the crashing towers as 
happened on 9/11 were repeated in news media in an uncountable amount. Also the pictures 
of shredded trains and body bags after 11-M, as well as the exploded bus in London, were 
frequently circulated in the months after the attacks. Therefore, it is not astonishing that 
terrorist attacks have the power to increase the salience of mortality in general which in turn 
leads individuals to contemplate their own death (Landau et al., 2004). 
When individuals contemplate their death, scholars of Terror Management Theory 
(TMT) hypothesize that worldview defense occurs. In context of worldview defense on 
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political ideologies (e.g., conservatism), Huddy and Feldman (2011) introduced the term 
ideological intensification. Ideological intensification means that individuals increase their 
conviction of their political view. Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg (2003) hypothesized 
worldview defense to occur also in context of major terrorist attacks. That is what I found in 
German data, for a period when the Madrid Bombing occurred: leftists became less 
conservative and centrists and rightists more conservative. 
With this finding, I make a contribution to an ongoing debate about the appropriateness 
of two competing theories: On the one hand, there is TMT with the ideological intensification 
hypothesis (Castano et al., 2011; Pyszczynski et al., 2006; Pyszczynski et al., 2003), on the 
other hand, conservatism as motivated social cognition theory (Jost et al., 2007; Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) whose advocates argue that threat, especially mortality 
salience, leads to a conservative shift. A conservative shift means that all individuals react 
with conservatism to existential threat. Recently, Burke, Kosloff, and Landau (2013) 
delivered a meta-analysis on this debate. The authors analyzed more than thirty experiments. 
However, the meta-analysis delivered no clear cut result about the superiority of one 
perspective over the other. Therefore, the results of Manuscript #3 are an important 
contribution to the research field because they are built on a large, representative panel dataset 
that covers a major terrorist attack. This increases external validity of the worldview defense 
hypothesis. On the other hand, this goes along with limitations of internal validity. However, 
the fact that the post-attack data was conducted only a few weeks after 11-M, when perceived 
terrorist threat was still increased, downgrades that limitation.  
A similar study covering a real world terrorist event is available by Echebarria-Echabe 
and Fernández-Guede (2006). However, they have only non-representative, independent pre-
post samples which allows no insights into the intraindividual process of ideology change. 
In terms of methodology, Manuscript #3 is to my knowledge the first one in that specific 
research field and in general one of the very rare manuscripts that applied latent true change 
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modeling (McArdle, 2009; Steyer, Eid, & Schwenkmezger, 1997). This method produces 
measurement error free change scores and is therefore highly advantageous compared to other 
change and difference scores. 
 
2.3 Anti-Muslim Backlash and Ideological Intensification – A Contradiction? 
An additional finding in Manuscript #3 was that prejudice (xenophobia) changed in the 
same ideology intensifying way as authoritarian submission did. Those on the left became less 
prejudiced whereas centrist and rightists increased in prejudice. On mean level, prejudice 
remained stable. With these results in mind, the question arises whether the same pattern 
would have been observable if the variable under scrutiny was anti-Muslim and not general 
prejudice. On the one hand, this makes sense as general prejudice and anti-Muslim prejudice 
share substantial variance, at least when measured in Germany (see Zick et al., 2008). On the 
other hand, according to Levine and Campbell (1972) it is probable that the reaction to the 
specifically threatening group is different than to unspecific foreigners (see also Fritsche, 
Jonas, & Kessler, 2011; Sides & Gross, 2013). Thus, one has to ask whether leftists defend 
primarily the Western World or their political ideology if a terrorist attack occurs. In this line, 
Jonas and Fritsche (2013) point to the flexibility of the worldviews defended, depending on 
the activated ingroup identity. Most of the research in the area of worldview defense 
(ideological intensification) showed that worldview defense occurred against individuals of 
the national ingroup with a contrary political ideology (Castano et al., 2011; Greenberg, 
Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992; McGregor et al., 1998) and not against ethnic 
outgroup members (but see Das et al., 2009; for an overview, see Greenberg & Kosloff, 
2008). The question is therefore whether a terrorist attack activates the ingroup identity 
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“German” 1 which would lead to worldview defense against “Muslims” or if one’s own 
political ideology is activated. The latter would lead to worldview defense against national 
ingroup members with a different political ideology. A third possibility is that both processes 
happen but in a sequential order. First, the ingroup “Germans” is activated and with 
decreasing emotionality one’s own political ideology gains attention. However, this is rather 
speculative which emphasizes the need for future research on worldview defense when it 
comes to real world terror. 
Finally, considering the large potential of centrists and rightistis due to their mere 
quantitative superiority, it is conceivable that anti-Muslim prejudice increases on mean level, 
even if leftists would decrease in prejudice (see Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). The discussion 
shows that anti-Muslim backlash and ideological intensification are not necessarily 
contradictory. 
                                                 
1 Also the ingroup „Westerners“ could be activated if an attack hits an allied country. When 9/11 occurred, the 
German parliamentary leader of the Social Democratic Party said: “today, we are all Americans” (Freeman, 
2001) which emphasizes that the definition of the ingroup depends on situations. 
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3. Outlook 
The attacks on 9/11 gained as much attention in the research community as they did in 
news media. Thousands of research papers from various disciplines are dedicated to the 
attacks that shocked the so called Western World. In this research, my co-authors and I 
demonstrated that perceived terrorist threat has far reaching consequences for a) Muslims in 
Western countries and b) for changes in political ideologies. These results make a valuable 
contribution to contemporary research on perceived terrorist threat. However, further research 
may provide new perspectives on the topic and cover the shortcomings of the present studies. 
 
An assumption throughout the thesis was that the quality of the Western stereotype of 
Muslims changed with 9/11. I argued that the facet “terrorist” was strengthened (e.g., US) or 
added (e.g., Germany) which made Muslims more threatening than before the attacks. To my 
knowledge, there is no such pre-post comparison for 9/11 (for a close approach, see Kalkan, 
Layman, & Uslaner, 2009). Seago (1947) delivers such a comparison for the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor in 1941 (see also Meenes, 1943). This study used the Katz and Braly’s (1935) 
method of ascertaining national and racial stereotypes. Study participants received a list of 84 
adjectives and had to allocate them to national groups. Seago (1947) revealed that the 
stereotypes versus Japanese changed dramatically in a negative direction after the attacks. 
From a modern stereotype content view, Sides and Gross (2013) demonstrated that 
Muslims in the US are perceived as violent and untrustworthy. Furthermore, they found that 
individuals who see Muslims in that way also rather support several aspects of the war on 
terror. Thus, there are hints for an integration of violent concepts into the stereotype of 
Muslims but there is no clear cut indication that this is caused by terrorist attacks. Therefore, 
further research should answer the question if stereotypes against Muslims are the same in 
terrorist threat and non-threat periods and how this affects attitudes and behavior towards 
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Muslims. One method to answer that question is continuous and frequent terrorist threat and 
Muslim stereotype monitoring. Such a dataset would also be appropriate to examine the 
impact of the mass media on perceived threat, as theorized in Manuscript #1. Moreover, 
insights into the process of specific activation of facets of the stereotype of Muslims by 
terrorist threat could be reached by running experiments. Terrorist threat could be 
experimentally manipulated and stereotype content then analyzed as outcome measure. 
Personality attributes that favor the perception of terrorist threat remained largely 
unconsidered in this thesis due to a different research focus. Huddy et al. (2005) provide an 
overview of predictors of terrorist threat. Gender (female) and authoritarianism are related to 
higher threat perceptions, whereas higher education reduces the perception of terrorist threat. 
In Manuscript #1, I derived a model from theory that predicted perceived terrorist threat 
becomes anti-Muslim prejudice, and prejudice then becomes discrimination. However, I could 
not validate this assumption: in Manuscript #1 the data was not appropriate for such an 
analysis and in Manuscript #2, anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination happened to be 
indistinct constructs. Therefore, further research should clarify this mediation, ideally by 
means of experimental terrorist threat manipulations and the measurement of real 
discriminatory behavior in the laboratory. In such a research design, the search for moderators 
of the assumed threat-prejudice-discrimination mediation should also be included. 
To get closer to the discussed mechanism of ideological intensification in case of anti-
Muslim prejudice (see chapter 2.3), I would suggest a two-stage research plan. First, the 
underlying processes need to be examined as thoroughly as possible in laboratory 
experimental research (for an overview, see Jonas & Fritsche, 2013). One of the crucial 
questions to answer is if worldview defense in response to terrorism differs depending on the 
activated ingroup identity (e.g., German vs. leftist). The second stage should then monitor 
individuals (political) ideologies and the relevant variables derived from stage one at regular 
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intervals (e.g., monthly)1. Such a panel design would enable researchers to study fluctuations 
of the constructs under research in a real world context. It would also allow to evaluate the 
above conceived idea of sequentiality, that individuals first defend their larger ingroup (e.g. 
country) and afterwards their political ideology. In terms of methodology, such a design 
would allow to analyze the data with elaborated methods from the family of longitudinal 
latent variable modeling (McArdle, 2009) and stochastic differential equations (Reinecke et 
al., 2005). 
 
Finally, I hope that the manuscripts of this thesis reach practitioners who develop more 
specific intervention programs to minimize the perception of terrorist threat and its 
consequences. Furthermore, I appeal to the mass media to start presenting Muslims not only 
in negative contexts but as peaceful members of today’s multicultural Western societies. The 
association of Muslims with terrorism needs to be cut. 
What gives me hope is the fact that the attacks on the Boston Marathon in April 2013 
did not lead to an anti-Muslim backlash. It seems as political and religious leaders learned 
from past mistakes and are now well prepared to react immediately in case of a new attack to 
avoid backlash. However, as stated in Manuscript #1 all these measures are rather 
symptomatic treatments for a long-lasting world conflict that unfortunately seems unsolvable, 
still. 
                                                 
1 However, such a frequent panel design could introduce issues in terms of learning effects (Tourangeau, Rips, & 
Rasinski, 2000). 
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Zusammenfassung 
Am 11. September 2001 veränderte sich die Welt, als die Großmacht USA von 
islamistischen Terroristen attackiert wurde. Mehr als 3000 Menschen starben durch die 
Attacken und mehrere Wahrzeichen amerikanischer Macht wurden zerstört. Diese Ereignisse 
versetzten Millionen von Menschen in der sogenannten westlichen Welt in Angst und 
Schrecken, was dazu führte, dass Islamistischer Terrorismus plötzlich eine ernstzunehmende 
Bedrohung darstellte. Viele Menschen in den USA und weiten Teilen Europas befürchteten, 
dass ihr Land aber auch sie selber Opfer von Terroranschlägen werden könnten. Bedingt 
durch immer neue Anschläge oder Anschlagsversuche, ist dieses Bedrohungsgefühl bis heute, 
mehr als ein Jahrzehnt später, nicht wieder komplett verschwunden. Daher widme ich mich in 
meiner hier vorliegenden Dissertation dem Phänomen der wahrgenommenen 
Terrorbedrohung und den resultierenden Konsequenzen. Konkret befasse ich mich einerseits 
mit den Konsequenzen des Terrors für die in westlichen Ländern lebenden Muslime und 
andererseits mit den Änderungen politischer Ideologien infolge von Anschlägen. 
Bedrohungen, gleich ob realistischer oder symbolischer Art, sind im Kontext von 
Intergruppenbeziehungen dafür bekannt, Vorurteile und Diskriminierung gegenüber 
Fremdgruppen zu verstärken (z.B. Integrated Threat Theory; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Am 
stärksten richtet sich ein solcher Effekt der Mehrheitsbevölkerung gegenüber der Minderheit, 
von der die vermeintliche Bedrohung ausgeht (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). Islamistische 
Terroranschläge müssten dementsprechend zur Abwertung von Muslimen führen. Die 
Manuskripte #1 und #2 beschäftigen sich mit dieser Annahme. 
Wahrgenommene Terrorbedrohung kann dazu führen, dass bei Personen Gedanken über 
den eigenen Tod salient werden (Landau et al., 2004). Die Salienz des eigenen Todes weckt 
den Wunsch, Teil einer Gemeinschaft und einer Weltanschauung zu sein, welche das eigene 
Ableben überdauert (Terror Management Theory; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, 
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Rosenblatt, & et al, 1990). Aus diesem Grund wird vermutet, dass Terroranschläge dazu 
führen, dass Individuen ihre Weltanschauung stärker vertreten (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & 
Greenberg, 2003). Mit dieser Hypothese befasst sich Manuskript #3. 
Die Ausgangsbeobachtung für Manuskript #1 war, dass es nach den Anschlägen vom 
11. September 2001 zu einer Welle von Hassverbrechen gegen Muslime in den USA kam. 
Die abgeleitete Forschungsfrage war daher, ob diese Hassverbrechen mit einem 
sozialpsychologischen Modell erklärt werden können, welches postuliert, dass 
wahrgenommene Terrorbedrohung zu Vorurteilen und Vorurteile wiederum zu 
Diskriminierung führen. Um die externe Validität des Modells zu prüfen, wurde es auf 
verschiedene Länder (USA, Spanien, UK, Deutschland) und verschiedene Terroranschläge  
(New York, Madrid, London etc.) angewendet. Die Datengrundlage bildete eine groß 
angelegte Recherche von Meinungsumfragen und Berichten zu den drei genannten 
Komponenten des Modells für einen Zeitraum von 2000 bis ca. 2012. Für jedes Land wurde 
also überprüft, ob nach einem Terroranschlag die wahrgenommene Terrorbedrohung, sowie 
Vorurteile und Diskriminierung gegenüber Muslimen messbar anstiegen. Die 
Allgemeingültigkeit des Models konnte nicht gezeigt werden. Dies geht auf die vielen 
Kontextfaktoren in den einzelnen Ländern zurück. Einige dieser Faktoren werden im Hinblick 
darauf diskutiert, wie der Teufelskreis von wahrgenommener Terrorbedrohung und Gewalt 
gegen Muslimen durchbrochen werden kann. 
Während die Datenlage in Manuskript #1 eine Makro-Perspektive auf die Verknüpfung 
von wahrgenommener Terrorbedrohung und Abwertung von Muslimen bot, wurde der 
postulierte Zusammenhang in Manuskript #2 auf Mikro-Ebene überprüft. Dieses Manuskript 
ging der Frage nach, ob wahrgenommene Terrorbedrohung tatsächlich Vorurteile produziert 
oder ob wahrgenommene Terrorbedrohung lediglich als Legitimation zur Äußerung 
bestehender Vorurteile genutzt wird. Auch eine Kombination der beiden Wirkrichtungen 
wurde in Erwägung gezogen. Die Datengrundlage stellte eine Panelstudie mit N = 88 
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autochthonen Deutschen dar. Die Daten wurden mit latenten, kreuzverzögerten Modellen 
(Cross-Lagged Modellen; Jöreskog, 1979) analysiert, um die zeitliche Abfolge des Prozesses 
bestimmen zu können. Die Ergebnisse zeigten, dass die wahrgenommene Terrorbedrohung 
Vorurteile über die Zeit vorhersagt. Dementsprechend sind Vorurteile gegenüber Muslimen 
ein Produkt von wahrgenommener Terrorbedrohung, wie es in der Integrated Threat Theory 
postuliert wird (Stephan, Renfro, & Davis, 2008). Folglich gilt es Bedrohungsgefühle zu 
reduzieren und die (mediengemachte) Verknüpfung zwischen Islam und Terrorismus zu 
schwächen. 
Manuskript #3 befasste sich mit der Auswirkung der Anschläge von Madrid (März 
2004) auf politische Ideologien in Deutschland. Wie oben bereits angedeutet, wurde die 
Hypothese getestet, ob sich Individuen nach einem Anschlag in ihrer politischen Ideologie – 
einem Aspekt ihrer Weltsicht – verstärken (Castano et al., 2011). Die alternative Hypothese 
lautete, dass alle Individuen gleichermaßen auf Terroranschläge reagieren und konservativer 
werden (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Ein für die deutsche Bevölkerung (16+) 
repräsentativer Paneldatensatz, der ein Jahr vor und wenige Wochen nach den Anschlägen 
erhoben wurde, bildete die Datengrundlage. Die Analysen, die unter anderem mit Latent 
Change Modellen (Steyer, Eid, & Schwenkmezger, 1997) durchgeführt wurden, zeigten, dass 
Menschen die sich zu t1 als politisch links einordneten nach den Anschlägen (t2) noch 
weniger konservativ wurden. Individuen, die sich hingegen zu t1 in der politischen Mitte oder 
rechts davon verorteten, wurden konservativer zu t2. Das gleiche Muster fand sich auch für 
Fremdenfeindlichkeit. Diese Ergebnisse bestätigten die Vorhersage der Terror Management 
Theory (Pyszczynski et al., 2003). Ein praxisrelevante Tatsache bei diesem Befund war, dass 
das quantitative Potential für einen konservativen Schwung weit höher ist, da die Gruppe der 
sich politisch in der Mitte oder rechts Einordnenden weit größer war, als die Gruppe 
derjenigen, die sich links verorteten. 
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Zusammengenommen weisen die Befunde der drei Manuskripte auf die weitreichenden 
Folgen von wahrgenommener Terrorbedrohung hin. Vor allem aber bietet das tiefere 
Verständnis der beschriebenen Phänomene die Möglichkeit effektive Handlungsstrategien 
abzuleiten, damit friedlebende Muslime in Zukunft nicht mehr die Sündenböcke für die Taten 
weniger Terroristen werden. 
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